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Abstract 
The Arms Trade Treaty brings together a number of small arms control norms into 
one instrument and is a new initiative, which was instigated by state and NGO norm 
entrepreneurs. This thesis attempts to understand what has led to the emergence of 
these norms in the Arms Trade Treaty, in what will be termed a ‘cluster’ of small 
arms norms. Examining the small arms norms associated with the Arms Trade 
Treaty will explain their development and their likelihood of successfully being 
incorporated into this instrument.   
 
Analysis of the development of the norms related to the Arms Trade Treaty will 
explore the relationship between norms, their promoters and their opponents. This 
thesis will do this by providing detailed analysis of the development of specific 
norms in a series of case studies: control over arms brokering, transfers to non-state 
actors and civilian possession. It will place this development within the broader 
context of the ATT instrument and the international society in which it is emerging 
into. This thesis finds that power and powerful states have a significant role to play 
in the emergence of norms, in some cases despite the efforts of norm promoters. 
Norms were not able to emerge in their original form due to the influence of 
powerful states, which resulted in norms evolving in different directions or not 
emerging at all.           
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Chapter One – Introduction 
Armed violence has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives since the end of 
the Cold War. Conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, are 
increasingly acknowledged by the international community as presenting a human 
security issue that needs to be addressed with cooperative action. One manifestation 
of this has been the development of a proposal for an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) 
within the United Nations, an international law which aims to regulate transfers of 
conventional weapons. The ATT is currently being negotiated and is due to be 
completed in 2012.1 The Treaty is not the only mechanism which has addressed 
small arms and light weapons; there are a number of norms related to the control of 
small arms and light weapons (SALW) which have been advanced by various 
sources outside the Treaty process.2 The ATT seeks to bring them together into one 
instrument, an effort which has obvious benefits, but also some drawbacks. This 
thesis attempts to understand how small arms norms emerged and to understand the 
impact of what I will term a ‘cluster’ – or interconnected set – of small arms norms 
on the ATT.    
Objectives and expectations 
This thesis explores the development of a norm cluster around the Arms 
Trade Treaty, seeking to understand why these norms have been associated with the 
Treaty and what role they will have in the future of the Treaty. The Treaty is a new 
initiative, prompted by state and civil society norm entrepreneurs in the field of small 
arms controls, but also in related fields such as peace-building, disarmament and 
                                               
1 The Arms Trade Treaty will alternatively be referred to by its acronym ATT.  
2 Small arms and light weapons will alternatively be referred to by the acronym SALW.  
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human rights promotion. The ATT is still in the process of formation, and as such, 
little scholarship has been done on the emergence and diffusion of the cluster of 
small arms controls which are linked to it.  
There is, however, substantial literature on small arms issues. Research has 
looked at the implementation of other small arms control mechanisms, such as the 
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects and the Protocol against the Illicit 
Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition.3 Other published work on small arms has been focussed on a specific 
area of arms control, such as disarmament programmes and tracing weapons4, or on a 
specific region such as South East Asia5, with the predominance of arms control 
efforts having focussed in the past on control of weapons of mass destruction or 
conventional weapons within a security framework. Despite a wave of norms 
literature published since the 1990s, there has not been enough attention paid to the 
way that power and powerful states contest, constrain and in some cases ultimately 
defeat emerging norms. In this thesis I seek to fill this gap in the academic work by 
looking in detail at the emergence and contestation of small arms norms in relation to 
the ATT. The thesis looks at the relationship between states and NGOs, arguing that 
whether or not particular small arms norms have been included in the Arms Trade 
Treaty cluster is strongly related to the efforts of strong states that either support or 
                                               
3 United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”; United Nations 
General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their 
Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations. Hereafter these 
instruments will be referred to as the Programme of Action and the Firearms Protocol respectively.  
4 Muggah, Listening for a Change! Participatory Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, 
Cambodia and Albania; Control Arms Campaign, Tracking Lethal Tools. Marking and Tracing Arms 
and Ammunition: A Central Piece of the Arms Control Puzzle.  
5 Capie, “Localization as Resistance: The Contested Diffusion of Small Arms Norms in Southeast 
Asia.”  
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object to the norm in question. It will look at the role of powerful states and rival 
NGOs, as well as considering the message that NGOs are promoting. By doing so, it 
fuses an interest in normative influence with a recognition of the role of power in 
international politics.   
Research questions  
How have small arms norms developed within the context of the Arms Trade 
Treaty? In seeking to answer this question, this thesis focuses primarily on three 
specific norms – action to address arms brokering, non-state actor acquisition of 
weapons and civilian possession. In the process of answering this larger question, the 
thesis will examine the content of these emerging norms and look at who has 
promoted (or opposed) them. I hope that these answers will shed light on the future 
direction and prospects for norms in the ATT norm cluster. 
Methodology 
In order to explore these issues, this thesis uses two main research methods: 
participant observation and content analysis. There has been a small but significant 
amount of academic work done in the past on the control of small arms and the 
norms which have arisen around it. Influential authors’ works will be analysed and 
referenced, including academic small arms literature by scholars such as Garcia and 
Clarke. These authors have looked at how small arms norms have been emerging 
over time and on success and failure of these norms in comparison to other weapons 
norms. Analysis of documents from the United Nations’ Institute of Disarmament 
Research and state submissions on a potential ATT will contribute to understanding 
the development of small arms norms. However, greater attention will be paid to the 
statements made by officials at the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations 
Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty in New York in July 2010 gathered during 
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attendance6, as well as documents from the second PrepCom in 2011 and past 
Government position papers on the Programme of Action.  
States used the initial week of the PrepCom to outline their general positions 
on the Treaty, with chair Ambassador Roberto García Moritán establishing a basic 
agenda for discussing the Treaty’s scope, parameters and implementation on the 
second day in closed sessions, despite opposition from NGOs. He allocated the 
remaining open sessions, which included time for civil society presentations, to 
discussing the elements, principles and goals of the Arms Trade Treaty. Moritán 
made it clear that he intended to cast a wide net with regard to what was being 
included in the ATT negotiations. Official documents released during the PrepCom 
by Moritán and his allocated ‘Friends of the Chair’, Ambassadors Aly, Charles and 
Quinlan, on these subjects will be analysed and referenced. Government position 
papers circulated at the PrepCom are used to inform the evaluation of state views of 
the norms in the Treaty. Notes taken from personal observation of states 
representatives at the PrepCom will also be used to form a better analysis of what 
states’ views on the ATT are and the place of norms in the ATT cluster. This 
information was obtained by personal attendance at the UN PrepCom meetings and 
taken down as completely and objectively as possible, taking care to note stated 
positions on the various norms which are part of the cluster. In addition, I will offer a 
personal perspective on the negotiations from informal meetings with civil society 
representatives, including Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam, and state 
officials whom I met during breaks in official meetings at the PrepCom.      
                                               
6 The Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty was held 
in New York, July 12-23 2010. This was the first of three Preparatory Committees, the second and 
third being held in 2011, in anticipation of the 2012 United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade 
Treaty. Hereafter the first United Nations Preparatory Committee will be referred to as the first 
PrepCom, and the first 2011 PrepCom will be referred to as the second PrepCom. 
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Outline of the thesis 
The thesis has seven chapters. Following on from this introductory chapter, 
the next two chapters situate small arms controls in the context of international 
relations scholarship. Chapter two outlines the evolution of the scholarship on 
norms, in particular research that has identified different pathways to explain the 
spread of diffusion of norms.  Chapter three then provides some background to small 
arms action, focusing on the emergence of the Arms Trade Treaty as a discrete 
mechanism. Chapters four, five and six then provide the empirical heart of the thesis, 
by looking in detail at the emergence and development of three key norms: control 
over arms brokering, the regulation of transfers to non-state actors and civilian 
possession. By focussing in depth on components of the Arms Trade Treaty as it 
relates to small arms, I show how small arms norms are developed, advanced and 
contested. Finally, the thesis concludes with answers to these questions based on the 
findings within, and makes some predictions about the future of the Arms Trade 
Treaty norm cluster.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 
 
Chapter Two – A review of  norms in theory and practice 
Introduction 
For most of the period leading up to the end of the Cold War, International 
Relations was dominated by realism and liberal institutionalism. It is only in the last 
decade and a half that political scientists have begun to experiment with sociological 
or social constructivist influences borrowed from other disciplines. The use of 
constructivist approaches to explain international politics has grown enormously in 
the last twenty years. In particular, the notion that the choices that actors make are 
influenced by how they perceive themselves and the world, and the influence of 
norms has come to have greater sway in political science. The field of norms is 
largely a practical one, in which a general assertion – that norms matter – is applied 
to a wide range of cases. One criticism directed at this scholarship is a focus on 
successful cases, examples where norms took hold, and ignoring cases where a norm 
failed to become established.7 For this reason, detailed case studies of the emergence 
of norms are useful, as they help to build a more accurate picture of which norms 
matter, why and when. This thesis uses three detailed cases of small arms control 
norms in the context of the Arms Trade Treaty to add to the emerging literature on 
norms theory.8   
Norms in international society 
Norms have arisen as a vehicle for understanding the motivations for 
decision-making in a way that rational choice theories of political science have not. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, several scholars undertook the study of norms in an 
                                               
7 Checkel, “Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory.”  
8 It should be noted here that the Arms Trade Treaty attempts to regulate all conventional weapons, 
not just small arms and light weapons. This will be explained in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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attempt to comprehend the ‘why’ of political decision-making. In an era of Cold War 
and post-Cold War politics, states’ reasoning in their international relations did not 
always make sense within the rational choice perspectives that were dominant at that 
time. It came to be theorised, by what is deemed the ‘constructivist school’, that 
people’s choices are bounded by their beliefs and expectations of the world around 
them. Whilst variously defined as “logics of appropriateness”, “standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”, or “collective expectations for 
the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity”, the essential meaning is the 
same; that there are some ‘standards of behaviour’ – norms – which can be 
universal.9 The existence of these norms places a feeling of obligation on actors to 
comply with the new expectation, regardless of its legal standing. As Finnemore and 
Sikkink theorised, norms that are fully accepted are later institutionalised into law. 10 
In the field of arms control, scholars have increasingly turned to normative theory to 
explain why actors make decisions and chose courses which cannot be easily 
explained by other theories. This move has been accompanied by a greater interest 
amongst ‘like-minded states’ and NGOs in norm promotion and has resulted in more 
action by these actors to promote arms control norms. This thesis looks at normative 
theory in relation to small arms in the Arms Trade Treaty in general and in three 
specific cases, to determine how these norms are developed and advanced or 
defeated by the relationship between their proponents and their opponents. This 
                                               
9 Checkel, “Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”; Finnemore and 
Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Florini, “The Evolution of 
International Norms”; Glatz, “Norm Diffusion: Top Down or Bottom-Up? Small Arms Norms in El 
Salvador, South Africa and on the International Level”; Krasner, International Regimes; O’Dwyer, 
“First Landmines, now Small Arms? The International Campaign to Ban Landmines as a Model for 
Small-Arms Advocacy.”  
10 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 898–899.  
16 
 
chapter will begin with a brief overview of the scholarship on norms, before moving 
to apply the theory to the case studies.    
Norms and norm clusters 
This thesis uses Krasner’s definition of norms – “standards of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations” – for several reasons. First, this definition 
is widely accepted. Second, it encompasses the way that a norm creates a 
commitment for actors to abide by the principles within it, and third, it reinforces the 
proposition that norms are actions or behaviours. However, this thesis goes further to 
suggest the Arms Trade Treaty is a norm cluster rather than a singular norm.11 The 
meaning of norm cluster here takes the simple form of ‘norm’ meaning “standards of 
behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations”12, and ‘cluster’ meaning a 
group of related things arranged or happening together. A norm cluster is thus a 
collection of norms that address elements of the same issue, but which each contain 
individual normative obligations themselves, much like the informal definition 
proposed by Hetcher.13 These norms all relate to one common subject, but address 
different aspects of the whole problem and thus contain different standards of 
behaviour and obligations to fulfil. The norms within the cluster will generally, but 
not inevitably, be in accord, as they (may) arise from different norm entrepreneurs, 
platforms and concerns.    
The emerging Arms Trade Treaty exists as a cluster of multiple norms. It 
does not outline a singular norm, nor is it an institution. Finnemore and Sikkink 
                                               
11 Ackerman, “The Prevention of Armed Conflicts as an Emerging Norm in International Conflict 
Management: The OSCE and the UN as Norm Leaders.” Ackerman refers to “clusters of norms” here. 
12 Krasner, International Regimes.  
13 Hetcher, “The Music Industry’s Failed Attempt to Influence File Sharing Norms,” 12. The term 
‘norm cluster’ is used in mathematics, biology, computer science and law, but each has a different 
meaning and none of them equate to the meaning of ‘norm cluster’ here. 
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differentiate between the term ‘norm’, and the term ‘institution’, arguing that an 
institution puts the emphasis on the ways that the beliefs connect, rather than on the 
beliefs themselves.14 In a similar way, this thesis looks at a norm cluster as a set of 
norms which address a related issue – in this case small arms control – rather than 
looking at how they interrelate. For the purposes of this thesis, it is understood that 
the norms within the cluster might not act in coordination, but the focus is on the 
development of the Arms Trade Treaty. A norm cluster differs from a regime in that 
a regime consists of more than just norms. According to Haas, a regime is “sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”.15 
Rittberger and Mayer add that “regimes can be identified by the existence of explicit 
rules which are referred to in an affirmative manner by governments, even if they are 
not scrupulously observed”.16 Given this, it is possible to say that a norm cluster is 
less formal than a regime, particularly considering Rittberger and Mayer choose to 
specify explicit rules and principles. Nor is a norm cluster an international 
institution, which is classified as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and 
informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations”, and includes international and transnational organisations, 
conventions and international regimes.17 Again, this is a more formal and established 
concept than that of a norm cluster. A norm cluster could be nascent, be in the 
process of diffusion or be institutionalised, just as a singular norm might be. In this 
context, there are several norms relating to the control of arms which are under 
                                               
14 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 891.  
15 Haas, “Words Can Hurt You; Or, Who Said What to Who About Regimes,” 211.  
16 Rittberger and Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, 28.  
17 Ibid., 28–29.  
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consideration for addition to the Arms Trade Treaty text, including rules around 
tackling illicit brokering, surplus stock destruction, regulation of civilian possession, 
and prohibiting transfers to non-state actors.18  
Norm emergence 
Finnemore and Sikkink’s influential article, ‘International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change’ has continued to resonate among scholars since its publication 
in 1998.19 It outlines a theory of norm creation that seeks to explain when and how 
new ideas and ‘logics’ came to exist. Whilst it is not the only theory of norm 
emergence, it is the dominant one.20 The authors look at gaps and puzzles in 
international politics, behaviours and decisions that realist and liberal theories cannot 
adequately explain. The resulting argument puts particular emphasis on the context 
in which decision-making occurs, and how it places limits on what choices appear 
available to decision-makers. How they understand the problem and see themselves 
in relation to others shapes their responses. New norms emerge from these situations, 
generally as a response to a perceived problem or when a situation changes making 
the normative guidelines less relevant. In line with this, Nadelmann’s second stage in 
the creation of a global prohibition regime describes this change as the point when 
previously acceptable behaviour becomes 
… redefined as a problem and as an evil – generally by international 
legal scholars, religious groups, and other moral entrepreneurs – and 
explicit government involvement in the activity is gradually 
delegitimized … 21 
                                               
18 See for example Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms.  
19 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”  
20 A simple search of the Google Scholar database for “norm emergence” shows over 1900 articles 
which cite Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’. 
Comparatively, Ann Florini’s article ‘The Evolution of International Norms’ has been cited by over 
200 other articles. [March 2011]  
21 Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society,” 485.  
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It is this period of change and redefinition that signals the emergence of a new norm 
into international society.  
The main hypothesis of Finnemore and Sikkink’s article is that norms emerge 
via a process of persuasion, before reaching a critical point and ‘cascading’ into 
general use through socialisation and then internalisation.22 Stage one is norm 
emergence, when the norm is nascent and is marginally supported. Through 
persuasion, actors are able to convince a number of other actors to support the norm, 
leading to a “tipping point”.23 Once a critical mass of actors support the norm – this 
can be a large number or a smaller number plus “critical” actors24 – the norm moves 
into the second stage, a period of strengthening, socialisation and diffusion.25 The 
final stage comprises of acceptance and internalisation of the new norm.26 Through 
their research, these authors determined that the mechanisms and actors differed at 
each of the three stages they identify. This has far-reaching consequences for both 
the study and practice of norms and norm change, as it seems that both during and 
after the initial phase of norm creation, the norm is reinforced and solidified by 
distinct devices. The subsequent stages of norm emergence follow a pattern of 
socialisation and institutionalisation, although the emergence of a norm does not 
guarantee its success.27  
In the initial stage, the norm is built through the work of a ‘norm 
entrepreneur’. This actor is responsible for the initial dissemination of the new norm, 
                                               
22 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”  
23 Ibid., 896–901.  
24 Ibid., 901.  
25 Ibid., 902–904.  
26 Ibid., 904–905.  
27 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Garcia, Small Arms 
and Security: New Emerging International Norms, pt. 3; Hetcher, “The Music Industry’s Failed 
Attempt to Influence File Sharing Norms.”  
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using the influence that they have with others to establish it as both plausible and 
credible. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that this process occurs because a norm 
entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs feels strongly about an idea. It may be an idea 
that they have taken on as an issue du jour; or it may be a new idea that transpires as 
a response to discussions, practices and interactions. They cite women’s suffrage as 
an example of norm emergence based on the activity of norm entrepreneurs.28 The 
idea that women should have the vote was alarming and novel to some, but through 
the persistence of agents, it became more widespread and finally universal. 
Importantly, “new norms never enter a normative vacuum”29; in cases of norm 
emergence, there is always competition between the old custom and the proposed 
change. It is the nature of the world, and of people, to compete and to question the 
appropriateness of ideas and practices. Finnemore and Sikkink note that the 
motivations of norm entrepreneurs can be described as “empathy, altruism and 
ideational commitment”.30 They are driven to promote new norms, even at risk to 
themselves as changing the logic of appropriateness may involve, improper or 
‘inappropriate’ actions. The norm promoters use praise, demonstration, and in some 
cases negative incentives, to convince other actors that these norms have merit.31 
This may require some changes to the norm. When this happens, the main actors 
may attempt to ‘frame’ the issue in a way that the community will understand by 
deliberately highlighting certain aspects of the emerging norm which have similar 
characteristics to pre-existing beliefs and understandings.32 In grafting cases, the 
                                               
28 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 897.  
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid., 898.  
31 Nevers, “Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement.”  
32 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 897; Payne, 
“Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction”; Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons 
Taboo”; Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation.”  
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norm is associated or aligned with a current norm, usually within a similar issue 
area.33  
The second main component of norm emergence, according to these authors, 
is an “organisational platform”.34 All of the examples that Finnemore and Sikkink 
document in their article show a normative entrepreneur working within or through 
an organisation. This organisation provides a starting point for the promotion and 
establishment of the new norm. It may already exist, or it may be created specifically 
for the purpose of changing the existing standards and logics. Without this 
institutional and informational backing, it is harder for these entrepreneurs to have 
the contemporary norm considered seriously by the international community. Within 
the organisational setting, the idea is able to be studied and shaped into a feasible 
policy.35 This in turn strengthens the support base of the norm, including support 
from states.  
Other, arguably less influential, theories of norm emergence challenge the 
norm creation process that Finnemore and Sikkink laid out. There are slight 
variations within these alternative models but for the most part, the norm remains 
intact and is accepted in that form by other actors. The nuances in these models 
include examining what kind of persuasion is used, how strong it is and which states 
or actors are involved36, and when and why an international norm is introduced by 
actors, domestic or international.37 Each of these studies helps to advance 
                                               
33 Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change 
in Asian Regionalism”; Price, “A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo”; Price, “Reversing the 
Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.”  
34 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 899.  
35 Ibid., 899–900.  
36 Nevers, “Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement.” 
37 Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”; Cortell and Davis 
Jr, “How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and 
Norms”; Erickson, “When Do the Takers Become the Makers? The Promotion of ‘Responsible Arms 
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understanding of how normative change occurs, when the norm in question appears 
to be universal enough that it needs no alteration to fit into various contexts. Clarke 
convincingly argues that the clarity of the norm content is important to the successful 
emergence of a norm.38 If a norm lacks clarity, its message is not robust, 
understandable or simple to communicate to audiences and therefore easy for 
opponents to defeat. Nadelmann considers the emergence of norms by looking at 
“global prohibition regimes”, and the reasons why they emerge.39 Global prohibition 
regimes are necessitated by the inability of states to curtail these undesirable actions 
individually or bilaterally and often arise where there are inadequate resources or 
issues of sovereignty surrounding the criminal activity which can be solved by 
creating a multilateral initiative.40 Ultimately, he concludes that regime creation 
depends on what national legislation is in place and the ability of moral 
entrepreneurs to build a strong case for such prohibition.  
Florini’s approach to norms takes a different angle in that it is based on the 
scientific theory of evolution, and the concept of ‘survival of the fittest’.41 This 
biological slant to normative theorising, despite obvious differences, proposes a 
similar line of thought in some ways to that of Finnemore and Sikkink. Both theories 
argue that norms emerge from a larger field of standards and beliefs, and that a new 
norm must compete with other current and new norms to ‘prove its worth’. Florini’s 
evolutionary model takes the view that  
                                                                                                                                     
Trade’ Norms”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; 
Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms”; Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: the 
Evolution of Norms in International Society.”  
38 Clarke, Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success 
and Failure.  
39 Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: the Evolution of Norms in International Society.” 
40 Ibid., 481.  
41 Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms.”  
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… norms, like genes, are instructional units. These units influence the 
behaviour of their host organisms. And norms, like genes, are 
“contested” – that is they are in competition with other norms or genes … 
42     
In this article, Florini argues that norms are inherited via a cultural rather than 
genetic transmission process, and that they represent a narrower category than 
merely behaviour that is physically possible, which she terms “conceivable 
behaviour”.43 Put simply, some options appear untenable, improper or merely 
unlikely to recipients. She proposes that norms emerge in the same way that genes 
do, which is that genes undergo a test of ‘fitness’ over time, determined by how well 
the gene reproduces, its ability to survive, and how well it suits its environment. 44 
The fact that the content of genes can alter results in the evolution of genes and this 
evolution only happens when there is a difference between the content of the genes, 
there is the ability to reproduce, and there is competition between the genes.45 Florini 
contends that norms act in the same way as genes.  
In considering the emergence and diffusion of a norm cluster, Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s work is more relevant to this thesis than these other theories for several 
reasons. Their theory covers the full range of norm emergence, from the birth of the 
norm to institutionalisation, in a way that other theories have not done. They allow 
for both states and non-state actors to have agency. Nadelmann’s theory focuses on 
regimes, which differ from norms – and norm clusters – too much to be relevant, 
although it offers important insights into the later institutionalisation of norms. 
Finally, Florini has used a theory of scientific evolution to explain the emergence of 
norms, but it fails to adequately explain how there come to be differences between 
                                               
42 Ibid., 364.  
43 Ibid., 366. Emphasis in the original. 
44 Ibid., 368.  
45 Ibid., 369.  
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the genes or norms, where the new idea specifically originates from. The reason for 
the surfacing of new norms is crucial for understanding who is supporting them and 
why. For these reasons, Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory is the most useful for this 
thesis.   
In critical essays, both Raymond and Legro argue that the way in which 
norms have been approached undermines the quality of the field of normative 
theory.46 Legro complains that authors have focussed on proving that norms 
“matter”, rather than on the content or the reasons why they matter.47 He asserts that 
this misinterpretation of the field has led to attributing an effect to a normative cause, 
without further exploration48, and Raymond notes that it can be difficult to measure 
the effect of a norm.49 Legro believes that this tautology lends itself to overlooking 
alternative explanations, and to a predisposition to the study of ‘successful’ norms.50  
Norm diffusion and institutionalisation  
Norm diffusion occurs when enough actors have accepted that the new norm 
is valid and more actors take up the new norm, accepting the limits and changes to 
behaviour it entails. According to Finnemore and Sikkink, this diffusion comes after 
a certain point in norm emergence, and results in a “cascade” of actors recognising 
the norm.51 It is after this diffusion that the new norm moves into a new period in 
                                               
46 Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism”; Raymond, “Problems 
and Prospects in the Study of International Norms.”  
47 Legro, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of Internationalism,” 31–32.  
48 Ibid., 33–34.  
49 Raymond, “Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms,” 219. 
50 Checkel also subscribes to these criticisms of normative theory. Checkel, “Review: The 
Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”; Checkel, “Norms, Institutions, and National 
Identity in Contemporary Europe.”  
51 Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 895–896, 901–902.  
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which it is accepted by actors as the new custom and internalised by them.52 Norms 
are internalised by the actors of the society as the accepted way of behaving and 
breaches of the new norm are rare. This constitutes the full and successful emergence 
of a norm into international society. As a norm cluster operates in a very similar 
way, the cluster can also be institutionalised into law, however as the norms emerge 
and develop within the cluster, the cluster may not remain intact or unchanged.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a survey of the norms literature and set out how 
norms emerge, using the framework of the norm lifecycle developed by Finnemore 
and Sikkink. The emergence of a norm is seen by the promotion of a new norm by a 
norm entrepreneur, using an organisational platform. The norm appears amid 
competition with other ideas, and has to appeal to the other actors in the system. 
Once a significant number of actors accept the new norm, it cascades into common 
use, and diffuses throughout society. This distribution occurs in one of three ways: 
promotion of the norm ‘as is’, norm framing or grafting, or localisation of the norm. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the concept of a norm – a standard of behaviour 
defined in terms of rights and obligations – is expanded into the concept of a norm 
cluster. A norm cluster operates in much the same way as a norm, and can also be 
incorporated and institutionalised into international law i.e. legalised, in the final 
stage of the norm life cycle. The next chapter will explore the history and emergence 
of the Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster and its contents, setting the scene for a 
detailed examination of its development and diffusion.       
 
 
                                               
52 Ibid., 902–905.  
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Chapter Three – The emergence of  the Arms Trade Treaty 
norm cluster 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at the origins of the Arms Trade Treaty, to understand 
what the Treaty norm cluster consists of, and how it relates to small arms. The 
chapter will begin with a synopsis of the small arms problem before continuing on to 
explain why the notion of small arms controls emerged as an international issue and 
to explore what ideas inform these controls. The chapter examines other normative 
influences on the development of the ATT, such as the evolution of the ban on 
landmines. The chapter will then briefly discuss the current small arms controls, 
before moving on to the evolving content of the ATT norm cluster itself. The various 
norms that make up the norm cluster of the ATT will be set out and examined in 
more detail, as they relate to the broader issue of small arms and light weapons. 
Understanding the content of the cluster provides insight into why states might be 
supportive of the cluster, or of specific aspects of it. This will bring us to a point 
where we can examine the specific engagement of states with the Arms Trade 
Treaty, and what that means for its future: institutionalisation or implosion.  
What is the small arms problem? 
The impact of armed violence, using small arms, on communities and nations 
is devastating.53 While the exact numbers are debated, thousands of people die each 
year from firearms-related deaths. There is confusion because the research done is 
often related to ‘guns’ or ‘firearms’ and not strictly designated as ‘small arms and 
                                               
53 The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development is aimed at highlighting the adverse 
effects of armed violence perpetrated using SALW by linking human suffering  to conflict and to the 
associated effects on socio-economic development. Geneva Declaration Secretariat, “The Geneva 
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development.”  
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light weapons’, which is a specific definition.54 This being the case, it is hard to say 
with any certainty how many deaths and injuries are caused each year by small arms 
but the research done on ‘firearms’ suggests that it is in the tens of thousands.55 The 
effects of small arms use – lethal and non-lethal – results in damage to human 
security, whereby people feel unsafe about their economic, health and political 
prospects.56   
The problems associated with armed violence involving these types of 
weapons are clear. Their presence raises the stakes in any confrontation to a lethal 
level. Injuries and near-fatalities from small arms fire are potential and real dangers. 
Firearms are used to commit crimes, either as a threat or as part of the crime. Cook 
and Ludwig argue that, in the US, firearms are commonly used in crimes and that the 
result is more homicides and/or injuries related to firearms use.57 The threat of the 
use of small arms can be used to achieve compliance with the user’s demands, in 
cases of domestic and intimate partner violence, and in other crimes such as 
robberies, assaults and sexual crimes.58 Firearms are increasingly used in cases of 
family violence and intimate partner violence.59 Interpersonal violence related to 
these types of weapons takes many forms, and can have a variety of outcomes 
including death, but may also mean a loss of physical mobility due to injury, or a 
                                               
54 In this thesis I will refer to firearms specifically as a sub-category of small arms and light weapons, 
for example when related to research done on firearms, not as interchangeable terms. United Nations 
General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms (Report of the Panel of 
Governmental Experts on Small Arms), 11–12.  
55 Geneva Declaration Secretariat, The Global Burden of Armed Violence; Richmond, Cheney, and 
Schwab, “The Global Burden of Non-Conflict Related Firearm Mortality.”  
56 Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting 
the Human Cost, chap. 5. 
57 Ludwig and Cook, “Public Policy Perspectives: Principles for Effective Gun Policy.”  
58 These types of use of small arms are in fact considered ‘misuse’ and therefore criminal.  
59 Wetzels, “Family Violence in the United States and Abroad, Guns at Home, Guns on the Street: An 
International Perspective.”   
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loss of sexual health. These experiences and other uses of small arms also impact on 
the mental health of the victim and the victim’s family, undermining human security 
further.  
Organised criminal groups also use small arms to destructive effect, as 
evidenced by the high levels of firearms homicide in countries like Brazil and 
Colombia.60 The 2010 Small Arms Survey reports on the possession and use of small 
arms by gangs and armed groups, noting that it is very difficult to count the number 
of weapons held by these entities.61 Inter-gang and intra-gang conflict often results in 
casualties as the newspapers of the world can attest to, regardless of the country. 
Armed groups are somewhat different from gangs in that perception of their 
behaviour and use of weapons can depend on the group in question, the information 
source, and what ‘cause’ the group fights for. As the 2010 Small Arms Survey 
comments, sometimes armed groups are called “community defence forces” and 
sometimes they are called “terrorists”.62  
The modern face of warfare is changing and conflicts are now no longer only 
state versus state involving state-based defence forces.63 Non-state armed groups are 
now participating in battles with state forces and each other. The 1990s was a decade 
of wars between states and non-state actors, including a number of deadly conflicts 
in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Algeria, Mexico and the Chechen region among others.64 These and other 
                                               
60 Godnick and Vàzquez, Small Arms Control in Latin America.  
61 Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2010: Gangs, 
Groups, and Guns, 102, 109–113. They estimate that out of around 650 million civilian owned 
weapons, between 3 and 11 million are in the hands of gangs and non-state groups. 
62 Ibid., 87–88.  
63 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a comprehensive source for conflict data and 
information, at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/. Last accessed on August 23, 2010. 
64 Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/. 
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wars were a mix of inter-state and intra-state violence, fought over territory, power, 
ethnicity, religion and resources. SALW are used by military forces and by non-
military forces to the same effect, as they are portable, easy-to-use and long-lasting. 
For as long as they are maintained in a reasonable state and there is corresponding 
ammunition, small arms remain useful. In many regions, small arms from the Cold 
War era are making their way from conflict to conflict as these stockpiles are 
gradually dispersed throughout the world.65 In particular both Africa and Latin 
America have been devastated by the availability of these types of weapons, 
suffering from conflict, irresponsible use and threat of weapons to commit atrocities, 
repression, and violation of human rights. Numerous Amnesty International reports, 
including the most recent global report, testify to the violence which is both 
perpetrated and assisted by small arms in these areas and throughout the world.66 
Access to these weapons by non-state armed groups is facilitated by black markets 
which supply globally. For these reasons, these two regions have been at the 
forefront of efforts to control arms at all levels.    
The emergence of conventional weapons controls 
The unrestricted availability of small arms and other conventional weapons 
contributed to a series of conflicts, particularly in the 1990s, both inflaming them 
and prolonging them. One of the consequences of this was a focus on the need to 
control the proliferation of all types of conventional weapons and to address root 
causes of such human insecurity. Former Secretary-General of United Nations, 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, released his report An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping in which he used the phrase ‘human 
                                               
65 Boutwell and Klare, “A Scourge of Small Arms.”  
66 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2010: State of the World’s Human Rights.  
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security’ to describe the state in which these conflict-affected people ought to be able 
to live.67 The control of small arms has therefore been influenced by human security 
because of the use of these weapons in conflict and the subsequent disarmament. 
Security sector reform and the demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration of 
combatants are now commonly used to build peace in regions which have 
experienced armed conflict, as it contributes to confidence-building and the creation 
of trust and peace between previously combatant groups.68 Weapons destruction is 
not only undertaken in post-conflict situations but also in states and regions where 
there is political will to do so in the face of proliferation of small arms creating 
insecurity, such as those undertaken successfully in Brazil and Albania.69   
Norms that influenced the Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster   
Other security norms have preceded the Arms Trade Treaty and thus have 
had an influence on its development.70 In this section, I briefly examine two different 
security norms which were institutionalised into international law, in order to explore 
what are the crucial elements for the legalisation of security norms.  
The norm against the use of landmines 
The path of the normative prohibition on anti-personnel landmines (AP 
landmines) and cluster munitions becoming law is quite similar, and very relevant to 
                                               
67 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping. 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the 
Security Council on 31 January 1992.  
68 Demobilisation, demilitarisation and reintegration is commonly referred to as DDR. 
69 Karp, Surplus Small Arms in South America; Muggah, Listening for a Change! Participatory 
Evaluations of DDR and Arms Reduction in Mali, Cambodia and Albania.  
70 Garcia, “Norm Building in the Evolution of the Control of Small Arms in the International 
Agenda.”  
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the control of SALW as will be seen in the following chapters.71 Both norms were 
driven in large part by the efforts of non-state actors, either NGOs or IOs, and states 
then took up the challenge of banning the use of these weapons. In the case of AP 
landmines, there were domestic groups addressing the public and their state officials 
on behalf of victims as early as 1991.72 The International Committee of the Red 
Cross was also involved in information dissemination and public campaigning for 
the use of AP landmines to end, as the casualties of these deadly weapons were 
increasing, and increasingly civilian in nature.73 A transnational civil society 
network, called the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was formed, 
and was crucial to the success of the ban as it was able to maintain momentum and 
pressure on states to produce an effective prohibition regime.74 O’Dwyer also 
theorises that the changed geopolitical setting was vital to the success of the 
campaign on states, as it enabled the move to majority voting within the Ottawa 
Process and a changed focus on human security rather than national security75, which 
saw states sign up to a prohibition on these weapons in 1997.76 Price and Clarke 
contend that the successful institutionalisation of the normative prohibition against 
                                               
71 Anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions are two separate weapons, although they are both 
explosive in nature. For a description of the difference between them, see the Landmine Monitor 
website, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/The-Issues/FAQs#23852. Last accessed on 
August 30, 2010. Anti-personnel landmines will hereafter be referred to as AP landmines.  
72 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines,” 620; The 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Mine Ban Treaty: Ban History.” The AP landmine 
prohibition is also referred to as the Mine Ban Treaty.   
73 Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.”  
74 Clarke, Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success 
and Failure; O’Dwyer, “First Landmines, now Small Arms? The International Campaign to Ban 
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Civil Society Targets Land Mines.”  
75 O’Dwyer, “First Landmines, now Small Arms? The International Campaign to Ban Landmines as a 
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Control of Small Arms in the International Agenda.”  
76 The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Mine Ban Treaty: Ban History”; United Nations 
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AP landmines was due to effective information dissemination, moral persuasion, and 
grafting of the norm onto other security norms by norm entrepreneurs of the ICBL. 77 
The ICBL was able to create political and virtual spaces in which to promote the ban 
on AP landmines and reconstitute them as a problem, which contributed to the 
successful achievement of the Mine Ban Treaty. 
The norm against the use of cluster munitions 
The road to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions was broadly similar to 
that of the development of the AP landmine prohibition from norm to international 
law. The Oslo Process was prompted by both the 2003 formation of the Cluster 
Munition Coalition and the coalescing of a group of ‘like-minded states’. It moved 
debate outside the official fora, after the failure to address the issue of cluster 
munitions within the Convention against Certain Conventional Weapons78 (CoCCW) 
in 1995 and other much earlier (failed) attempts.79 Norway and certain other states 
became norm entrepreneurs in conjunction with these NGO coalitions, pushing for a 
number of international and regional conferences which were attended by many 
states. These conferences successfully helped to build and maintain the impetus of 
the campaigning so that a treaty was created in 200880, and the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions came into force on August 1, 2010.81 This anti-cluster munitions 
                                               
77 Clarke, Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Human Security Initiatives: Explaining Success 
and Failure; Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines.”  
78 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
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79 Corsi, “Towards Peace Through Legal Innovation: The Process and the Promise of the 2008 Cluster 
Munitions Convention”; The Cluster Munition Coalition, “The Problem: What is the Oslo Process?”; 
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80 Corsi, “Towards Peace Through Legal Innovation: The Process and the Promise of the 2008 Cluster 
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The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Convention on Cluster Munitions: Ban History.”  
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norm developed via norm promotion and framing, and Corsi notes that it both built 
on and contributed to norms of international human rights and humanitarian law 
related to indiscriminate weapons.82 Corsi argues that norm entrepreneurs were able 
to effectively link the proposed ban on cluster munitions to these established norms 
and to the institutionalisation of the ban on AP landmines.  
What are the current formal controls on small arms and light 
weapons? 
Small arms and light weapons come under a number of international rules in 
a general sense, as they fall into the category of conventional weapons, however no 
attempt to address small arms specifically until recently. Because nascent small arms 
norms build on the foundation of conventional weapons controls to some extent, this 
section will briefly outline these conventional weapons controls before looking at 
those specific attempts to control the transfer and acquisition of small arms. 
General conventional weapons measures 
In 1991, the UN Register of Conventional Weapons (UN ROCA) was created 
as a voluntary reporting mechanism to improve transparency in the trade of weapons 
between states and to prevent the stockpiling of weapons. It has seven categories and 
includes most types of conventional weapons in existence at that time.83 Reporting to 
the UN ROCA was part of the response to “the danger of increasing illicit and covert 
arms trafficking”; however states have never universally, comprehensively or 
consistently reported to the UN ROCA.84 This indicates that its usefulness in 
                                               
82 Corsi, “Towards Peace Through Legal Innovation: The Process and the Promise of the 2008 Cluster 
Munitions Convention.”  
83 United Nations General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: Transparency in 
Armaments, para. 7. The seven categories are outlined in the Annex, being: Battle Tanks; Armoured 
Combat Vehicles; Large Calibre Artillery Weapons; Combat Aircraft; Attack Helicopters; and 
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84 Ibid., para. 4c.  
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controlling the trade in conventional weapons has been limited and it must also be 
noted that although small arms are considered ‘conventional’, they are not accounted 
for within the UN ROCA. At the same time, Resolution 46/36 acknowledges the 
“human suffering” caused by actions fuelled with illicit weapons.85     
Since the establishment of the UN ROCA however, a number of other 
initiatives have been undertaken in the area of controlling the trade in small arms and 
light weapons. In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly asked the Secretary-
General to establish a group to look into  
… (a) The types of small arms and light weapons actually being used in 
conflicts being dealt with by the United Nations; 
(b) The nature and causes of the excessive and destabilizing 
accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, including 
their illicit production and trade; 
(c) The ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and 
destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons, 
in particular as they cause or exacerbate conflict … 86 
 
This was in response to a number of conflicts in the world which the United Nations 
was involved with, but particularly in regard to the situation in Africa. It is also the 
first time that small arms were addressed in substance in this forum. Resolution 
50/70 resulted in the creation of a Group of Governmental Experts on the question of 
small arms, which reported back in 1997 that there was indeed a need to continue 
looking at the proliferation of small arms and its effects.87 After that time, the United 
Nations kept itself regularly updated on the global situation regarding small arms and 
                                               
85 United Nations General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: Transparency in 
Armaments; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Disarmament Commission (Guidelines 
for International Arms Transfers in the Context of General Assembly Resolution 46/36 H of 6 
December 1991).  
86 United Nations General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms.  
87 United Nations General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: Small Arms (Report of the 
Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms). This report will be referred to as the Panel of Experts 
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light weapons.88 Following this report, a meeting of NGOs was held in 1998 on the 
possibility of creating an instrument on SALW led by the now seasoned advocate 
against landmines, former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy.89 While this 
instigated a more serious NGO effort to campaign on the issue, it was immediately 
apparent that this was a very different fight to the anti-land mines campaign. 
Other tools of armed violence prevention through the United Nations have 
been the CoCCW and its associated Protocols90, which uphold the Geneva 
Conventions.91 Weapons which are indiscriminate are prohibited. The CoCCW 
specifically refers to non-detectable fragments, mines, incendiary weapons, blinding 
laser weapons and explosive remnants of war.92 However small arms and light 
weapons are not considered to be excessively harmful and most small arms and light 
weapons are discriminate due to their scopes or guidance systems.       
The Firearms Protocol 
In 2001, the United Nations made its first attempt to address the proliferation 
of SALW and their effects using legislation. Several supplementary protocols were 
added to the Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (CTOC)93, one of 
                                               
88 See for example the relevant sections of the resolutions on General and Complete Disarmament, 
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 51/45 (1996), 52/38 (1998), 53/77 (1999), 54/54 
(2000), 55/33 (2001), 56/24 (2002). After 2001, small arms were dealt with more specifically in 
relation to other measures taken at that time. 
89 Lumpe, “Curbing the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons.”   
90 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols).  
91 United Nations General Assembly, Geneva Conventions (and Additional Protocols).  
92 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have 
Indiscriminate Effects (and Protocols). Protocols 1-5. 
93 United Nations General Assembly, Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Hereafter 
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which was the Firearms Protocol.94 The Firearms Protocol is a legally binding 
instrument which criminalises any illegal manufacturing or trafficking of firearms 
and any removal or change to identification marks on the weapons, as well as 
requiring Party States to establish export licence systems.95 The Firearms Protocol is 
reasonably restrictive within its remit, but its remit is also narrow, making it virtually 
invisible in terms of achieving actual reductions in small arms trafficking. This is 
because relevant offences against the Firearms Protocol must be “transnational in 
nature and involve an organised criminal group”.96 Nor does the Firearms Protocol 
apply to any transfers between states, or where the transfer would affect the ability of 
Party States to ensure their “national security”.97 The limits of the Firearms Protocol 
are made quite clear in several cases where the actions would have breached the 
Firearms Protocol if they involved an organised criminal group or if the states 
involved were Party States. These include the cases against arms dealers Monzer al 
Kassar, Leonid Minin, Vladimir Montesinos and Viktor Bout.98 The Firearms 
Protocol does however show that there is an emerging shift in how international law 
regards small arms and light weapons. It also provides proof that there is a normative 
change towards seeing these weapons as a ‘problem’, and follows ‘framing’ theories, 
                                               
94 United Nations General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
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as the Firearms Protocol was created after the precedent of the AP landmine ban 
(1997) previously mentioned.99  
The Programme of Action 
The United Nations Programme of Action on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms 
and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was the precursor to the Arms Trade Treaty. 
Unlike the Treaty, it is a politically binding instrument which was created in 2001, at 
the conclusion of the United Nations Conference on small arms issues in New 
York.100 The Programme of Action specifically refers to the damage done by the 
illicit arms trade in its preamble and the way that it “exacerbates violence, 
contributes to the displacement of civilians, undermines respect for international 
humanitarian law, impedes the provision of humanitarian assistance to victims of 
armed conflict and fuels crime and terrorism”.101 The Programme of Action requires 
states to make an effort at the national level to prevent and reduce the illicit transfer 
of small arms through a number of actions such as establishing effective export 
control and licensing systems, recording and reporting transfers and ensuring that 
manufacturers are licensed.102 Further to this, regional and international cooperation 
and actions are also recommended to prevent international illicit transfers of these 
weapons.103 The document, while only politically binding, is the most comprehensive 
international treatment of the issue of the transfer of SALW. It has therefore 
contributed extensively to the development of norms associated with these weapons 
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such as brokering, marking and tracing, and the destruction of weapons surplus to 
requirements.   
Specific regional agreements 
Soon after the 1995 Resolution 50/70 and the Panel of Experts Report which 
was actioned by that resolution, Latin America took action to address the problem of 
illicit SALW. The Organisation of American States (OAS) established the Inter-
American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Related Materials in 1997 after agreeing that 
these weapons posed a threat to both national and regional security.104 The Inter-
American Convention was a legally binding instrument and became a point of 
reference for other international tools created to tackle the proliferation of small arms 
and its effects.105 In addition, there have been a number of other measures taken in 
the greater Latin American region such the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission’s Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of 
Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.106  
Other regions have since followed suit, developing their own legislative and 
regulatory mechanisms to ‘prevent, combat and eradicate’ illicit small arms trading. 
In Africa, the South African Development Community (SADC), the Economic 
                                               
104 Organisation of American States, Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. Hereafter this 
instrument will be referred to as the Inter-American Convention and the Organisation of American 
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Convention. 
105 Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms, 53.  
106 Andean Community, Decision 552: Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (and Annexes); Nicaragua, “Working Paper 
Submitted by Nicaragua: Code of Conduct of Central American States on the Transfer of Arms, 
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Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Great Lakes Region and 
Horn of Africa have all established mechanisms to control the transfer of weapons. 107 
The SADC created the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other 
Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region 
in 2001108, which requires member states to take a number of actions such as 
preventing “unrestricted possession of small arms by civilians” and marking and 
tracing of these weapons was undertaken.109 Likewise, the Great Lakes Region and 
Horn of Africa grouping instigated the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control 
and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the 
Horn of Africa in 2004.110 ECOWAS was a trailblazer in the area of SALW controls, 
as they instituted a three year moratorium on light weapons as far back as 1998, 
which has been continued since that time.111 Later they addressed the issue of SALW 
with the 2006 ECOWAS Convention, which dealt with small arms by establishing a 
system whereby no transfers were allowed unless specifically granted an exemption.  
112  
In Europe, both the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have addressed the issue of small arms 
                                               
107 Hereafter the Southern Africa Development Community and the Economic Community of West 
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108 Southern African Development Community, Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and 
Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Region. Hereafter 
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110 Republic of Burundi et al., The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of 
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proliferation recently, through a series of Codes of Conduct, Handbooks and Joint 
Actions.113 The Pacific region created the Nadi Framework to begin work on 
preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.114 Similarly, the League 
of Arab States has a 2002 Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and 
Hazardous Material and later continued to undertake a series of resolutions on the 
issue.115 From this array of regional legislative and regulatory instruments, it is 
possible to see a recent trend which suggests increasing acceptance of small arms 
norms.          
The Arms Trade Treaty 
The Arms Trade Treaty is a proposed international law, combining a number 
of small arms control norms into one mechanism which is legally binding on Party 
States. It draws on the variety of instruments already in place, to create a global 
standard for all conventional arms trading between states. The Treaty was first 
considered in 2006, when Resolution 61/89 established a Group of Governmental 
                                               
113 Council of the European Union, European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports; Council of the 
European Union, Council Joint Action of 12 July 2002 on the European Union’s Contribution to 
Combating the Destabilising Accumulation and Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons and 
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114 South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference (SPCPC) Working Group and Pacific Islands Forum, 
“Nadi Framework: Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control.” Hereafter this 
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115 League of Arab States - Ministerial Council, Resolution 6447 on Arab Coordination for Combating 
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons; League of Arab States - Ministerial Council, 
Resolution 6625 on Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
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Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous Material. Hereafter the Arab Model Law on 
Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous Material will be referred to as the Arab Model 
Law. 
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Experts on the arms trade116, before a draft resolution to work towards an Arms Trade 
Treaty was proposed by like-minded states and accepted in 2009 by the United 
Nations117. Many NGOs in the human security area welcomed this development, 
having worked on protecting human rights and life against armed violence for years, 
however pro-gun NGOs view this occurrence as alarming. The response from states 
has been mixed, as they recognise the wide array of policies and practices that this 
instrument will affect.  
The cluster of norms being considered for inclusion into an international law, 
regulating the trade in small arms and light weapons and other conventional 
weapons, has been established over a period of time. Each is based on the promotion, 
diffusion and institutionalisation of it into international society, however not all of 
them are equally accepted or institutionalised, in fact some have been considered to 
have failed. Nevertheless, these norms continue to be associated with the ATT and 
its promotion. This indicates that a closer look at these norms is needed to ascertain 
their position in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty and its future acceptance.   
The Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster 
There are seven major norms in the Arms Trade Treaty cluster, and several 
other less dominant associated norms. The seven primary norms are 1) brokering, 2) 
civilian possession, 3) destruction and disposal of surplus stock, 4) international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law, 5) marking and tracing, 6) 
preventing non-state actor acquisition, and 7) transparency. This thesis focuses on 
just three of these – brokering, civilian ownership and non-state actor acquisition – 
                                               
116 United Nations General Assembly, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common 
International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms.  
117 Argentina et al., The Arms Trade Treaty (revised draft resolution), United Nations General 
Assembly.  
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and these were chosen because they represent points of confluence or conflict and 
thus arguably have the power to shape the final outcome of the Treaty. However all 
seven of these dominant norms are strongly associated with the Arms Trade Treaty 
and its ultimate purpose of controlling conventional weapons, including SALW. The 
cluster of norms which relate to the Arms Trade Treaty all seek to ameliorate the 
proliferation of SALW, and the effects that this proliferation has. At the first 
PrepCom, Canada, Egypt, France and Japan specifically referred to creating a 
‘normative’ framework or Treaty, for the purpose of controlling small arms.118 The 
four primary norms not studied here include one of the most well-known and 
accepted norms in the control of small arms: the destruction and disposal of surplus 
weapons. Garcia argues that this norm was developed in three stages, related to the 
emergence of post-conflict peace-keeping, the effects of the dispersion of excessive 
state arsenals after the Cold War and finally the numbers of confiscated weapons 
related to crimes.119 The removal of weapons from tense post-conflict situations is a 
positive step towards building trust between the previously conflicting parties, and 
their destruction prevents them finding their way to another conflict. This norm 
emerged in 2003 as states included disarmament and destruction efforts when they 
reported to the UN on their implementation of the Programme of Action.120 A second 
UNIDIR report indicated even more states were making efforts in the field of 
disarmament and disposal of small arms, strengthening the norm further, and DDR 
                                               
118 Notes taken by author at the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the 
Arms Trade Treaty, New York, July 12-23 2010. [Hereafter these will be referred to as ‘Author’s 
notes from PrepCom Day X, y session’.]  
119 Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms, 66–68.  
120 Ibid., 69; Kytömäki and Yankey-Wayne, Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of Reports Submitted by States in 2003.  
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has now become an accepted practice.121122 Statements made at the first PrepCom on 
the Arms Trade Treaty include references to destruction and disposal of surplus 
weapons, both in post-conflict situations and in terms of preventing destabilising 
accumulation of weapons in any state.123 Thus we can say that the norm has both 
emerged and been institutionalised to some degree into states’ thinking about and 
practice related to SALW.124   
Another leading small arms norm is the requirement for marking of 
weapons.125 As was briefly alluded to above, weapons and ammunition are marked 
upon manufacture or import, in order to trace their path from manufacture to end 
use.126 The purpose of this is threefold: first it assists in the recordkeeping related to 
these weapons and their ammunition; second it assists in tracing these items in the 
case of their illegal manufacture/modification, transfer or use (and possible 
prosecution of such actions at either national or international level), and third, these 
two practices enable confidence-building and transparency in the sector. This 
                                               
121 Kytömäki and Yankey-Wayne, Five Years of Implementing the United Nations Programme of 
Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Analysis of National Reports.  
122 See for example Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat, The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
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morning session; United Nations General Assembly, The Arms Trade Treaty; Moritán, “Chairman’s 
Draft Paper - 22 July 2010”; Quinlan, “Facilitator’s Summary on Parameters.”  
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in this practice being undertaken. Control Arms Campaign, Tracking Lethal Tools. Marking and 
Tracing Arms and Ammunition: A Central Piece of the Arms Control Puzzle.  
44 
 
concept was first put forward in the Inter-American Convention127, and subsequently 
included in the Programme of Action in the form of a requirement for states to 
ensure that manufacturers marked weapons at the time of production.128 In addition to 
the emergence of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, 
in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2005 as a 
specific tool to address the issue129, the norm is clearly becoming stronger as it has 
been included in the Firearms Protocol and various international and regional 
instruments.130 It was also mentioned in the first PrepCom by a number of states and 
in the draft outcome documents.131 
Related to this norm, and to more general norms of good faith interactions 
between states, is the norm of transparency in the area of small arms and light 
                                               
127 Organisation of American States, Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of 
and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. Article VI.   
128 United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.” Section II, Para. 
7.  
129 United Nations General Assembly, International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, 
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Model Regulations for the Control of the International Movement of Firearms, their Parts And 
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Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. Basic Documents; United Nations 
General Assembly, General and Complete Disarmament: The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in all its Aspects.  
131 Author’s notes from PrepCom Day 2, morning session; Author’s notes from PrepCom Day2, 
afternoon session; Author’s notes from PrepCom Day 3, afternoon session; Author’s notes from 
PrepCom Day 4, morning session; Author’s notes from PrepCom Day 5, morning session; Aly, 
“Facilitator’s Summary on Implementation and Application.”. The concept is also referred to 
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weapons control. Marking and tracing is undertaken by states to contribute to 
transparency in the trade and more general confidence-building. These markings are 
recorded and used in any investigation of criminal activity, but they can also give a 
more accurate picture of stockpiles for destruction and preventing “destabilising 
accumulations” of weapons.132 Obviously, releasing detailed information about state 
stocks – or armed group stocks for that matter – is not something that is common 
practice. National security is a notoriously opaque area of government, and states’ 
defence force and law enforcement officials are unlikely to support such 
transparency measures without some form of compulsion, therefore it may be 
surprising to note that this norm is developing in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty. 
Garcia credits its development to a pioneering study done by the United Nations in 
the early 1990s on “ways and means of promoting transparency” of armaments and 
the role of the United States in promoting democracy.133 In the years after this, the 
United Nations continued to refer to notions of transparency in relation to arms 
transfers and controls, including in several instruments on arms transfers and in 
resolutions on the feasibility of an ATT.134 Other international and regional 
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instruments also referred to transparency.135 Numerous statements at the PrepCom 
referred to the importance of conducting negotiations in a transparent manner and to 
including measures to ensure that transparency is included in an ATT, in relation to 
reporting on transfers and activities.136 This suggests that the norm of transparency is 
in fact quite strong in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty.     
The inclusion of International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) into arms controls is not a new consideration, but it has 
proved problematic in practical terms. Specific references to IHL and/or IHRL have 
been included in the Programme of Action, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Andean 
Plan, the Nairobi Protocol, the Central American Code of Conduct, the EU Strategy 
Document, OSCE Document and the ECOWAS Convention. However an equivalent 
number of arms international and regional instruments make no reference to 
humanitarian or human rights concerns, which cut across regions which have also 
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Principles”; Quinlan, “Facilitator’s Summary on Parameters.”  
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recognised the notion.137 Morocco and the United Kingdom referred to upholding 
humanitarian law as the ‘raison d'être’ of the ATT at the PrepCom.138 Many states 
referred to IHRL and IHL in their early submissions on the Programme of Action; 
however analysis of their later submissions shows fewer references.139 The resolution 
which established the negotiations on the Arms Trade Treaty alludes to both IHRL 
and IHL, and the need for states to respect such principles, as do previous resolutions 
on the development of the ATT.140 Despite this, there is no consensus about whether 
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or not to include such references in the Arms Trade Treaty, with several states 
expressing concern about the inclusion of such “subjective” criteria for evaluating 
arms transfer decisions.141 These are indeed subjective criteria with which to guide 
decision-making about arms imports, exports and transfers of all forms, but this may 
not be as problematic as they are painted. There are instances where independent, 
authoritative sources are able to verify such occurrences and these could act as a 
baseline for such decisions, in a similar way to that which the United Nations uses to 
make decisions about the imposition of arms embargoes on nations in conflict.  
In addition to these core norms (and the three that follow in the next chapters) 
there are several other, less prominent norms related to the Arms Trade Treaty, 
being: prevention of diversion, ammunition, victim assistance, assistance to 
implement the Treaty, organised crime/terrorism, dual use components, restricted 
production, and associated technology. Ambassador Moritán commented on his draft 
‘non-paper’ on elements to clarify that some ideas were not listed specifically as they 
would naturally flow from other elements listed, or might be addressed in another 
area of discussion, noting prevention of diversion as one such norm.142 Victim 
assistance was championed by NGOs and rarely mentioned by most states.143 
Ammunition was a contentious issue in all contexts it was referred to, but several 
states defended the inclusion of it, albeit some within the remit of the ‘7 + 1 + 1’ 
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formulation.144 Dual-use goods and technologies were equally divisive concepts 
during the discussions, with no clear consensus on their inclusion or exclusion.145   
Conclusion 
The Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster has emerged from a series of earlier 
normative developments. It represents the culmination of years of norm promotion 
and education by states and NGOs, to having become more or less acceptable 
standards of behaviour for arms transfers and therefore obvious source material for 
the ATT. As shown above, the elaboration of the cluster of norms in the Arms Trade 
Treaty has been foreshadowed by the development of other security norms, namely 
those related to AP landmines and cluster munitions. The divergent progress of the 
paths of these norms in the security field left open the ability to predict the course of 
the ATT norm cluster. In combination with the wide remit of the negotiations at this 
point, it becomes important to consider the path of the most prominent norms within 
the cluster to determine the future of the Treaty, and it is to this task that the next 
chapters turn.      
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Chapter Four – Brokering and the Arms Trade Treaty 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus is on how the norm regulating brokering developed 
in relation to small arms and the Arms Trade Treaty. It begins by explaining what 
brokering is and what the norm is, before undertaking an analysis of the development 
of the regulation of brokering norm in the ATT context.  
What is brokering? 
An arms broker is generally considered to be an actor who facilitates a 
transaction in which small arms are traded.146 The Group of Experts Report of 2007 
describes a broker as  
a person or entity acting as an intermediary that brings together relevant 
parties and arranges or facilitates a potential transaction of small arms 
and light weapons in return for some form of benefit, whether financial 
or otherwise.147 
Any actions which a broker undertakes can be either legal or illegal, depending upon 
whether the correct authorisation has been granted and the goods have been 
appropriately transported according to the manifesto and any potential safety 
considerations. In the case of weapons, most actors involved are state officials and 
manufacturers in the defence sector, and therefore the requisite authorisations and 
considerations are undertaken as a matter of course.148   
                                               
146 Brokering is not an activity restricted to the field of arms transfers. 
147 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International 
Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. Hereafter referred to as the Experts Report on Brokering. 
148 Many civil society organisations and some states are pushing for the inclusion of human rights law 
and international humanitarian law into arms trade decision-making by states. See Moritán, 
“Chairman’s Draft Paper - 22 July 2010”; International Committee of the Red Cross, Arms Transfer 
Decisions: Applying International Humanitarian Law. Practical Guide.  
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The common practice of brokering in small arms and light weapons can be 
described thus: Person A wants to purchase small arms but may not know Person B, 
who has these weapons to trade.149 Person C, a.k.a. the broker, may do nothing more 
than introduce the persons involved and be paid for doing so, or they may be more 
involved such as in transporting the goods to their destination or handling the 
purchase of the goods. The weapons then go on to fuel conflicts, contribute to crimes 
or violate human rights. The Experts Report on Brokering itemises potential 
brokering activities as “technical assistance, training, transport, freight forwarding, 
storage, finance, insurance, maintenance, security”, showing a range of potential 
brokering activities.150 The exploits of such infamous figures as Victor Bout, Leonid 
Minin, and Jean Bernard Lasnaud showcase the illicit activities that brokers engage 
in.151 They are known to purchase weapons with false identification and licences, 
then transport the weapons without the correct authorisation, using fake travel and 
export documents where necessary. Officials are bribed to overlook any 
discrepancies and identifying features on transportation are altered at will to evade 
discovery.152 The Experts Report on Brokering stated that  
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Likewise for Person B, although most brokers (Person C) tend to operate as individuals or in very 
small groups, within a greater network involving all aspects of (illicit) transactions and transportation.  
150 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International 
Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons.  
151 Amnesty International, “Italian Courts Release Arms Dealer”; Brunwasser, “Gunrunners: Gallery 
of International Arms Dealers - Leonid Efimovich Minin”; Brunwasser, “Gunrunners: Gallery of 
International Arms Dealers - Victor Anatoleyevich Bout”; Reynolds, Kistner, and Lavieri, 
“Gunrunners: Gallery of International Arms Dealers - Jean Bernard Lasnaud.”  
152 Amnesty International, Dead on Time – Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human 
Rights; Amnesty International, Deadly Movements: Arms Transportation Controls in the Arms Trade 
Treaty; United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International 
Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons.  
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Analyses of such activities revealed that illicit brokers typically conduct 
their business by exploiting legal loopholes, evading customs and airport 
controls, and falsifying documents such as passports, end-user 
certificates and cargo papers.153  
These arms brokers have been able evade prosecution in relation to illicit arms 
transfers for some time, owing to loopholes in jurisdiction and legislation. 
Several brokering cases have been tried throughout the world, and while 
many of them were tried domestically, each had international aspects. The United 
States tried Monzer al Kassar, Tareq Mousa al Ghazi and Luis Felipe Moreno Godoy 
in 2007, after it was alleged that they sold weapons to a terrorist organisation, 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).154 In 2008, Russian resident 
Victor Bout was arrested and extradited to the US to face charges of illicit arms 
brokering in violation of its anti-terrorism law, also for supplying weapons to FARC, 
and is currently facing a court trial.155 It is believed that the US is attempting to use 
these cases to find out more about the arms trafficking process, rather than target 
Bout specifically for his dealings with FARC.156 Previously two other cases had been 
undertaken, in Italy for Leonid Minin who allegedly breached an arms embargo in 
Sierra Leone157; and in the US for Vlademiros Montesinos who is linked to several 
                                               
153 United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts Established 
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 60/81 to Consider Further Steps to Enhance International 
Cooperation in Preventing, Combating and Eradicating Illicit Brokering in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons, 7.  
154 Brunwasser, “Gunrunners: Gallery of International Arms Dealers - Monzer al Kassar”; United 
States of America v. Monzer al-Kassar, Tareq Mousa Al Ghazi, and Luis Felipe Moreno-Godoy, 
Defendants.  
155 Brunwasser, “Gunrunners: Gallery of International Arms Dealers - Victor Anatoleyevich Bout”; 
United States of America v. Viktor Bout, a/k/a “Boris,” : a/k/a “Victor Anatoliyevich Bout,” : a/k/a 
“Victor But,” : a/k/a “Viktor Budd,” : a/k/a “Viktor Butt,” : a/k/a “Viktor Bulakin,” : a/k/a “Vadim 
Markovich Aminov,” and Andrew Smulian, : Defendants. United States of America : Sealed 
Complaint: Violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2339B & 3238.  
156 Horn, “Cold Case - Viktor Bout: Arms and The Man.”  
157 Amnesty International, “Italian Courts Release Arms Dealer.” The trial was unsuccessful.  
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other arms dealers and was convicted for supplying FARC with weapons.158 These 
cases put pressure on states to take action against high-profile arms traffickers, 
despite issues with jurisdiction. The judges in the Minin court case specifically 
lamented the court’s lack of jurisdiction, with one source reporting that 
Italian judges said they found it very difficult to prosecute a man accused 
of illegally trafficking arms that originated and were transferred outside 
of Italian territory … 159 
This statement goes to the heart of the issue: there is no international law which 
curbs the ability of brokers to facilitate weapons sales to those who should be denied 
access.        
What is the norm regulating brokering in small arms? 
The norm regulating brokering in small arms consists of three main 
requirements:  first, that brokers of these weapons are registered or licensed in some 
form; second, that their actions are regulated to ensure that correct procedures are 
followed and can be verified; and third is a sanctioning mechanism.160 Garcia argues 
that the norm emerged as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1013 (1995) 
which established an International Commission of Inquiry into how weapons got to 
                                               
158 Kistner, “Gunrunners: Gallery of International Arms Dealers - Sarkis Soghanalian.”   
159 Amnesty International, “Italian Courts Release Arms Dealer.”  
160 These elements are drawn from the Programme of Action, the Experts Report on Brokering, the 
Firearms Protocol, the Model Convention on Brokers and the Wassenaar Arrangement’s ‘Best 
Practice Guidelines for Export of Small Arms and Light Weapons’. The Fund for Peace, “Model 
Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms 
Brokering”; United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, “Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”; United 
Nations General Assembly, Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations; United Nations 
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Rwanda before the genocide, in breach of several UN arms embargoes.161 There were 
also a number of studies done by NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch on the situation in Rwanda up to and during the genocide. These 
concluded that the weapons had been transferred from a number of different states, 
through an intricate network of transfers, and identified that there was an absence of 
an international mechanism to address this issue.162 Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch acted as the primary norm entrepreneurs by instigating the 
international community’s investigation into international arms trading, through the 
dissemination of these reports and continued education using their organisations’ 
credibility to persuade others of the legitimacy of their claims. Additionally, they 
worked to ‘name and shame’ those manufacturers and countries which were found to 
have produced weapons which were found in Rwanda, challenging the idea that this 
behaviour is acceptable.163 Since that time, Oxfam has joined these organisations to 
promote the norm, working with the Control Arms Campaign and providing reports 
on brokers and their actions.164    
By the end of the 1990s, a group of like-minded states and NGOs had 
emerged to promote the regulation of brokering, including Norway, Canada, 
                                               
161 Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms, 93–95; United Nations 
Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1013. Both UNIDIR and the Experts 
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international community. Kytömäki and Yankey-Wayne, Five Years of Implementing the United 
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162 Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms, 93–94; International 
Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda), “Final Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
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163 Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms, 94.  
164 Cairns, “Dying for Action: Decision Time for an Urgent, Effective Arms Trade Treaty”; Control 
Arms Campaign, Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global Controls; Homayun, 
Brokers Without Borders: How Illicit Arms Brokers can Slip Through Gaps in the Pacific and 
International Arms Control System.  
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Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Fund for Peace. These groups 
and states continued to promote action, but with little success. The most explicit 
reference to the subject was the United States’ inclusion of brokers in its own laws165, 
until it was brought up in detail at the second of two Oslo meetings on small arms in 
1999.166 This meeting specifically dealt with concerns about brokers being able 
operate in “grey zones” on the edges of the law or in places where there was no 
law.167 These ideas led to several publications, including the Model Convention on 
the Registration of Brokers and the Suppression of Unlicensed Arms Brokering, 
drafted for the Fund for Peace.168 This Model Convention on Brokering further 
developed the norm to regulate brokering and was presented to the 2001 Programme 
of Action Conference. Most like-minded states and interested NGOs were involved 
in the Oslo meetings, and in a later Ottawa meeting to prepare for the Programme of 
Action Conference.169 These organisations and states then went back to their 
constituents and continued their work on building the credibility of the norm and 
writing policy briefs. There were other conversations also being held around the 
world, such as the Bonn-Berlin Process and the Dutch-Norwegian Initiative170, and a 
2005 Hollywood blockbuster Lord of War about an arms broker which brought the 
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and Light Weapons: Elements of a Common Understanding”; Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms 
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of the Disarmament Commission (Guidelines for International Arms Transfers in the Context of 
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168 The Fund for Peace, “Model Convention on the Registration of Arms Brokers and the Suppression 
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169 Godnick, The Organisation of American States and the 2001 United Nations Conference on the 
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issue to the general public’s attention, with its star Nicolas Cage working with 
Amnesty International on the issue.171  
After this slow start, a plethora of small arms control mechanisms came into 
existence after the 2001 Programme of Action, which says that states ought to 
… develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures 
regulating the activities of those who engage in [SALW] brokering … 
such as registration of brokers, licensing or authorization of brokering 
transactions as well as the appropriate penalties for all illicit brokering 
activities performed within the State's jurisdiction … 172  
Many of these later control mechanisms did include brokering. Some of these 
mechanisms mention brokering regulation briefly, such as the Wassenaar 
Arrangement’s Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons and the OAS Model Regulations.173 Others, like the Wassenaar 
Arrangement’s Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering, addressed it 
more specifically.174 These elaborations indicate some acceptance of the norm to 
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174 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), “OSCE Handbook of Best Practices 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Decision No. 5/03 Best Practice Guides on Small Arms and Light 
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regulate brokering by 2006, when the United Nations General Assembly passed 
Resolution 61/89, entitled Towards an Arms Trade Treaty.175    
The norm regulating brokering in relation to the Arms Trade Treaty 
The first resolution on a potential Arms Trade Treaty, Resolution 61/89 
Towards an Arms Trade Treaty, requested that states respond to the Secretary-
General’s request for their views on the “feasibility, scope and draft parameters” of 
such an instrument.176 Their responses can be found in a series of documents 
numbered A/62/278177, and Parker also took these states responses and collated them 
into two reports titled Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty and 
Implications of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty.178 The Resolution also 
established a Group of Experts on the same subject with a mandate to report back, 
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International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms.; United Nations 
General Assembly, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards 
for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms.; United Nations General Assembly, 
Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export 
and Transfer of Conventional Arms. (Addendum); United Nations General Assembly, Towards an 
Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and 
Transfer of Conventional Arms. (Addendum); United Nations General Assembly, Towards an Arms 
Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of 
Conventional Arms. (Addendum); United Nations General Assembly, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: 
Establishing Common International Standards for the Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional 
Arms. (Addendum).  
178 Parker, Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty; Parker, Implications of States’ Views 
on an Arms Trade Treaty. Hereafter these reports will be referred to as ‘Analysis of States’ Views 
Report’ and ‘Implications of States’ Views Report’. Note: Parker adds a caveat to her initial report: 
“states were free to include or omit whatever issues, themes and categories they chose. For example, 
simply because they did not express support in their submission for the inclusion of a reporting 
mechanism does not mean that they would oppose such.” Therefore figures given indicate a minimum 
level of support from states. Parker, Analysis of States’ Views on an Arms Trade Treaty, 3.  
58 
 
which they did in the 2007 Group of Experts Report A/63/334, based on their own 
expert knowledge179, and on the work of experts from UNIDIR.180   
At the most recent Arms Trade Treaty PrepCom, brokering was mentioned 
by a number of states, although it is difficult to be specific about the figures as some 
statements contained implicit references to brokering.181 In addition, some of those 
states that mentioned brokering did not support it.182 However, this notwithstanding, 
there is some consensus being established among states on what constitutes a broker 
and their associated activities, in terms of a definition. Other mechanisms have 
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Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty.”  
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defined brokers and their actions in a variety of ways183, thus several states 
specifically remarked in their responses to Resolution 61/89 on the need for a clear 
definition of brokering activities.184 During the first PrepCom states continued to 
bring the issue up, as it pertains to the scope of the Treaty, and most states believed 
that a precise definition was needed.185 None of the outcome documents from the first 
PrepCom defined brokering but the Facilitator’s Summary for Scope noted that a 
number of states used the Experts Report on Brokering definition of brokers and 
brokering, as outlined earlier.186 
The norm continues to develop as it appears in the context of the ATT with 
two distinct themes emerging during the brokering debate on the Arms Trade Treaty. 
The dominant theme was illicit brokering, and the secondary theme was whether to 
include the norm within the ATT at all.   
Illicit brokering 
The theme that emerged most clearly in ATT discussions was that of taking 
action against illicit brokering, which is entwined with the first two requirements of 
the brokering norm. Debates were strongly influenced by differing underlying 
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positions on national security and human security. The impact of concerns voiced 
about terrorism, in relation to these and other conventional weapons, also affected 
this norm. Prior to the first PrepCom, it was clear that the norm regulating brokering 
was emergent but that its detail was still being decided.    
During the first PrepCom debate, two sides emerged: those states that wished 
to restrict the Treaty to regulating and sanctioning illicit actors and actions; and those 
who wanted a more comprehensive instrument to regulate brokering. These latter 
states argue that weapons are often diverted from the legal trade; therefore it makes 
sense to incorporate both licit and illicit brokering, to address the issue completely to 
ensure human security from all ‘irresponsible’ arms transfers. Many states that 
referred to the regulation of brokering norm are already known as norm promoters in 
the field of peace and disarmament, and other states have emerged as particular 
supporters of the Arms Trade Treaty initiative and therefore many of the norms in 
the cluster.187 In addition, many of these states are members of organisations which 
have regulatory mechanisms which include brokering, for example the SADC 
Protocol.188 Their statements thus reinforce their previously noted positions and 
extend them to the context of an ATT.189 These states have continued to promote the 
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more robust position of including all brokering, with support from a number of 
NGOs which attended the first PrepCom. Organisations such as Amnesty 
International spoke about the importance of human security which can only be 
gained from a strong Treaty which incorporates regulation of all transfers, including 
brokering and other “irresponsible” transfers.190 Some states have also supported 
human security in relation to the ATT.191  
A large number of the states that promoted the broader norm regulating 
brokering in the Arms Trade Treaty have a vested interest in preventing small arms 
proliferation by brokers, because of their own experiences with armed violence and 
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conflict.192 Representatives of African states spoke about brokering as something 
which exacerbates conflict and undermines UN embargoes, human rights and socio-
economic development.193 They were particularly concerned with preventing the 
supply of these weapons to areas in conflict or post-conflict situations, as small arms 
are used to violate human rights and contribute to under-development and human 
insecurity as well as increasing the lethality of a conflict.194 There is a recognition 
that small arms and light weapons, in particular, are easy to obtain from brokers. 
Other states which supported a comprehensive approach to brokering in the ATT, 
from South America and the Caribbean, linked the conflict with illegal criminal 
actions such as gang violence and drug trafficking, also because of their 
experiences195. Many of these South American and Caribbean states have been the 
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‘victims’ of brokers in small arms because of their proximity to the US and the 
porous border.196 Looking at these countries’ statements, brokering is spoken about in 
terms of establishing criminal sanctions, preventing corruption and preventing 
diversion from the legal trade, but still reflects a concern about human insecurity as a 
result of under-development due to armed violence. These states have attempted to 
shape the inclusion of a broad norm regulating brokering in the ATT by appealing to 
human security norms and are supported by credible NGOs with evidence on the 
effects of brokering.    
Of the states that focussed their submissions on illicit brokering, the US was 
a key proponent, albeit not the most vocal on the issue, because of its broader 
influence in international politics. The 2009 decision by the US to support the ATT, 
a watershed moment for the Treaty, was partly made because of the Obama 
Administration’s decision to change national security policies generally197. More 
clearly at work however, was the stated belief that creating such “high international 
standards” will decrease access to weapons for “rogue states, terrorist groups, and 
groups seeking to unsettle regions”.198 Since 9/11, the US has become very concerned 
about the ability of ‘rogue’ actors and terrorists to access various types of weapons 
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and weaken national security, including on its own southern border.199 The US has 
strong weapons export controls, and justifies its position on regulating illicit 
brokering at the first PrepCom by blaming this practice for its weapons being found 
in the hands of those it has deemed terrorists.200 This is reinforced by its prosecution 
of several brokers like Montesinos and al Kassar under counter-terrorism legislation. 
Counter-terrorism measures have also included prevention of illicit brokering efforts 
in other arms control areas, notably supporting the landmark UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1373 and 1540.201 However regulation of illicit brokering allows for the 
continuation of licit brokering, and these kinds of weapons transfers have been used 
to stabilise a ‘region under threat’ or to shore up support for on-going military 
action.202 The US has disputed the need for a comprehensive norm regulating 
brokering because it seeks to continue this type of transfer to its allies. The US 
decides which regimes it believes are ‘legitimate’ and has coordinated action against 
those which do not meet the criteria, including by arming NSAs involved in the 
conflict.203 It sees itself as the arbiter of international relations, persuading other 
states to back its actions, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it controversially 
supported NSAs against the ‘repressive’ leadership.204 This explains why there has 
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been no mention of comprehensive brokering regulation by the United States, despite 
its experiences with brokers like Bout and Montesinos. 
States which have valid concerns about terrorism in their states, having 
experienced it, raised this issue at the first ATT PrepCom with reference to 
brokering. Indonesia, which has concerns about real or potential illicit weapons 
transfers in relation to terrorism, linked the two in ATT discussions, as have other 
states like India and Pakistan.205 While not mentioning brokering specifically, a 
number of states acknowledged that illicit transfers have contributed to terrorism 
both at the first PrepCom206 and in previous statements.207 Many states are aware of 
the US position on terrorism and thus are susceptible to its muted norm promotion. 
Several of them have gained weapons and financial assistance for supporting the 
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US’s anti-terrorism stance, in addition to being brought back within the US circle of 
legitimacy.208 Some of these have not experienced incidents of terrorism, for example 
New Zealand and Norway, which indicates the strength of the links being made 
between the Treaty and terrorism.209 The EU also supports the inclusion of terrorism 
in the ATT, evidence of a move towards supporting illicit brokering, rather than 
taking a more comprehensive approach.210 Its member states have experienced 
terrorism and some of the brokering cases touched on here have included European 
citizens or have a European connection.211 The EU has also moved to support illicit 
brokering because of its apparent dilemma between continuing to allow its members’ 
lucrative weapons exports, which could be brokered either legally or illicitly to 
others, and its sensibility of the need to provide human security which it 
champions.212 Member states of the EU and potential members have made billions of 
dollars from exporting weapons and weapons technology. In addition, these states 
wish to retain their ability to legally transfer weapons to specific NSAs, in a policy 
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similar to that of the US, to enable them to oppose tyrannical governments.213 This 
has prompted them to support the reframing of the norm towards regulating illicit 
brokering. Support from such a large number of powerful states, in the United 
Nations Security Council and outside it, has provided a tipping point for the norm, 
with other states moving towards this position in closed session discussion as 
evidenced by the Chairman’s Draft Paper.214  
The delegation of the Russian Federation made references to the need to 
regulate brokering which reflect “weak links” in the legal trade.215 It stated that 
Check-ups we conducted … showed that the arms found in embargo 
areas came from other countries’ territories. Those arms were either 
imported from Russia or the USSR in earlier years or manufactured 
without licences or under expired licenses …216 
Further statements made by the Russian Federation continue to place brokering 
controls within the context of preventing illicit diversion with regard to conflict 
(rather than terrorism).217 Russia is a major importer and exporter of small arms, and 
wishes to retain its right to trade with few restrictions, holding to the position that 
defence transfers are internal decisions and outside the UN jurisdiction. It has 
worked hard for some years to prevent Bout, a Russian resident, from being 
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extradited and tried for illicit brokering.218 This supports claims that it wishes to keep 
the ATT focussed on illicit brokering219, and away from questions about who is 
legally being supplied by the Russian Federation with weapons and the implications 
of this for human security. Similarly, China argues that states should ‘crack down’ 
on illicit trading and that exports of arms ought to be undertaken with the legitimate 
self-defence needs of the importing state in mind and not used to undermine state 
sovereignty.220 China continues to export weapons to a number of states and actors 
which have questionable human rights records or are in conflict, appearing to reject 
the concept of ‘responsible’ transfers as defined by other states.221 Both China and 
Russia contest the need for a comprehensive norm regulating brokering. 
Other states share China’s concerns that state sovereignty and the right to 
manufacture and export weapons will be eroded by an ATT which includes strict 
regulation on brokering. India wished to keep discussion about the ATT on the 
‘illegal trade’, claiming that it damages economic growth as well as peace and 
security, which Pakistan agrees with.222 Both these states have been increasingly 
involved in the profitable conventional arms trade, and argue that allowing only 
some states to benefit from such trading is inequitable. Various other states reiterated 
concerns about self-defence capabilities being undermined by an ATT, particularly if 
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it was ‘discriminatory’.223 At previous discussions on the Arms Trade Treaty, Middle 
Eastern states mentioned their belief that there is only a small illicit trade based on 
“smuggling, cases of diversion, uncontrolled civilian weapons and loopholes in border 
controls”.224 These states are traditionally anti-intervention in any form, believing that 
state sovereignty and non-intervention as laid out in the UN Charter are sacrosanct.225 
Several have also experienced challenges to their authority from NSAs. Submissions 
from both France and Israel focussed on preventing “illicit trafficking” and ensuring 
that licit brokering for self-defence was allowed.226 The primacy of the state and its 
security over human security is clear, as these states continued to urge each other at 
the first PrepCom not to undermine the legal trade and principles of non-intervention 
by regulating all brokering. 
Contestation of the content of the norm regulating brokering had a clear 
impact on the Treaty discussions involving brokering in the closed sessions, wherein 
states focussed on its scope, parameters, and implementation and application, as 
illustrated by the contents of the papers distributed by the Chair’s ‘Friends’.227 The 
Chairman's Draft Paper, the final outcome document of the first PrepCom, 
specifically lists brokering among the elements to be included in an Arms Trade 
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Treaty which the earlier Chairman’s Draft Elements did not.228 Ultimately, the side 
promoting illicit brokering – and national security, preventing terrorism and 
sanctioning licit brokering – was triumphant, as one of the goals listed was to 
“Prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit … brokering of conventional weapons”.229 
Furthermore, a second stated goal is preventing diversion to “unauthorised … users” 
which it specifies includes terrorists.230 This change provides evidence that powerful 
states in the United Nations have been able to influence the norm and diffuse it 
within the ATT discussions. The evolved norm regulating illicit brokering will 
remain in the ATT, as evidenced by its inclusion in the ‘Goals and Objectives’ of the 
2011 Chairman’s Draft Paper.231 This move undermined the efforts of NGOs to 
persuade states to take a more comprehensive approach, and is evidence that while 
NGOs have been able to influence the inclusion of items for negotiation at Treaty 
discussion, they have little power to ensure they are retained against the influence of 
more powerful states and stronger norms. 
A small group of have tried to prevent the norm regulating brokering being 
included in the ATT at all, owing to their concerns about national security, non-
intervention and being able to continue legal brokering. The UN General Assembly 
discussed brokering for some time, and subsequently passed Resolution 65/75 on 
illicit brokering in December 2010.232 This resolution relates to all conventional 
weapons, and is what states meant when referring to a ‘future international 
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instrument on brokering’ separate to the ATT233, or stating that “internal transfers” 
were not within the scope of the ATT.234 While some states explain that this is 
because it is under discussion elsewhere, other nations point to the fact that states are 
the predominant conventional weapons purchasers and suppliers, making 
international mechanisms on this tantamount to intervention.235  
Conclusions 
States have been successful in having the norm regulating brokering included 
in the ATT, albeit in a revised form, with the retention of the evolved norm 
regulating illicit brokering in the final outcome documents of the first PrepCom and 
the second PrepCom.236 The Arms Trade Treaty includes the regulation of brokering 
norm – including regulation of brokers, their actions and sanctions to engender 
compliance – but the discussions at the first PrepCom highlighted a split in how 
states perceive the norm. The majority of states accept the norm as is, with a focus 
on human security and regulating against ‘irresponsible’ transfers. However key 
states, including the US, Russia, China and members of the European Union, have 
successfully promoted a development of the norm towards illicit brokering, to align 
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with concerns about terrorism, national security and non-intervention. These 
powerful states have been able to diffuse the altered norm to other states at the ATT 
PrepCom. The debate resulted in support for a revised, limited norm regulating 
brokering, which focuses on illicit brokering rather than all brokering. Two 
conclusions can be drawn from these debates. First, it is clear that measures to 
address illicit brokering will remain within the Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster. 
Second, it is equally clear that NGOs only have limited power as norm entrepreneurs 
in the face of more powerful states and their preference for measures which privilege 
national security and non-intervention.  
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Chapter Five – Non-State Actors and the Arms Trade Treaty 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, the issue of controlling access to weapons by terrorists, 
insurgents and non-state armed groups has become a common fixture on the agenda 
of international institutions. This chapter addresses attempts to create a norm 
regulating the acquisition of small arms and light weapons by these non-state actors, 
specifically looking at efforts to include the norm in the Arms Trade Treaty. A few 
states interpreted the norm regulating transfers to non-state actors in a broad way, 
preventing weapons transfers to all NSAs, but other states believe that NSAs have a 
role to play in international politics and took a more discriminatory approach to the 
norm. The chapter begins by defining what is meant by non-state actors, and how 
controlling their access to weapons came to be an international issue. It will then 
briefly analyse the norm as it emerged outside of the ATT, before moving on to 
assessing how it has been debated and contested within the ATT norm cluster.   
Non-State Actor Acquisition of Small Arms and Light Weapons  
There are a multiplicity of actors other than states active in international 
politics, so it is important to clarify from the outset what this thesis defines as a ‘non-
state actor’ in the context of small arms controls.237 Parker does not specifically 
define the term, but separates those actors which are not states into “criminal groups, 
terrorists [and] unauthorised non-state actors”.238 The Biting the Bullet Project notes 
that non-state actors range from these more common definitions through to private 
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security companies and civilians.239 In their ATT submissions, a number of states 
refer to terrorists or to organised criminal groups, while only a few use the term 
‘non-state actors’ explicitly. In their seminal work on armed groups and human 
rights, Petrasek and Mann define non-state actors as “groups that are armed, use 
force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control”.240 This definition 
incorporates the possibility of all three of the groups which Parker separates, and is 
thus the definition used by this thesis. Its focus is also explicitly on acquisitions by 
groups, so will not address civilian acquisition of weapons, a topic that is addressed 
in the next chapter. 
Why weapons transfers to non-state actors are problematic 
Non-state actors are increasingly powerful, but states have traditionally been 
defined as those with a monopoly on the use of force. This has created tension 
between the two because this right to use force has been a source of state legitimacy 
for hundreds of years and increasingly common use of force by NSAs challenges 
this. In some cases, armed non-state actors represent a real threat to the continued 
existence of a state and to its ability to function, as well as to civilians. For states 
with NSAs within their borders, there is the potential for NSAs to take action against 
the state but also for competition between NSAs, such as gangs or tribes, to cause 
serious and destabilising conflict.241 While less common, states have been known to 
arm resident non-state actors, for example to use against other NSAs which no 
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longer support the state. Non-state actors may also engage in conflict with opponents 
in another state.242 Critics point to the fact that NSAs are not accountable to any 
authority and are not bound by the same laws of war that states are, with instances 
where they have put civilians’ lives at risk, violated human rights and undermined 
economic development.243 However, some states believe that NSAs have a function 
in international politics, for example to challenge a repressive state or a state which 
is believed to be no longer accountable to its citizens. In these cases, supportive 
states have been known to supply weapons to non-state actors, either in another 
country or in their own country, to enable their cause.244  
States are overwhelmingly the dominant purchasers of conventional weapons 
in the licit market, particularly because many are large and expensive items such as 
tanks and helicopters. For non-state actors, small arms and light weapons are far 
more important: they are accessible because they are cheap and easily transported, 
although the export of conventional weapons is monitored by the states in which 
they are produced.245 Such scrutiny has forced NSAs to turn to the illicit market (or to 
supportive states) to procure these items which are then used in the commission of 
crimes, to violate human rights or to kill. To prevent this from occurring, a norm 
against transfers of small arms to NSAs has begun to emerge.      
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The development of the norm against SALW transfers to non-state 
actors 
The norm against transfers of small arms and light weapons to non-state 
actors consists of a presumption that states will deny SALW transfers to non-state 
actors, a mechanism to regulate transfers and to determine breaches of the law, and a 
sanctioning mechanism.246 Many states are concerned about the implications of any 
international controls on the transfer of arms, and the controversial debate at the 
international level about who is and is not authorised to have access to weapons.247 
Garcia describes this norm as one which has failed to emerge due to this controversy, 
despite the normative framework of IHL onto which it could be grafted.248 In Small 
Arms and Security, she traces the origins of the norm to a 1998 speech by former 
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy249, in which he proposed that action to 
control small arms was necessary and possible (including transfers to NSAs), after 
which it was taken up by a number of small arms campaigners.250 The norm was not 
well-received by governments at that time, nor during debates at the 2001 
Programme of Action Conference, at which the African Group failed to have the 
norm included in the Programme of Action.251 There was recognition among states 
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that it was a controversial norm and that it would be difficult to implement. It took 
the efforts of the Biting the Bullet Project, which specifically took up the 
development of this norm as a project outside of official fora to garner widespread 
attention.252 Biting the Bullet established the Consultative Group Process (CGP) as a 
forum for experts to identify “shared understandings and ways forward” relating to 
preventing weapons transfers to NSAs.253 Their paper on the development of a norm 
against transfers of arms to non-state actors was issued in advance of the 2006 
Programme of Action Review Conference, to prompt discussion and to clarify the 
content and scope of the norm.254 In a report following the PrepCom for the 2006 
Review Conference, it was noted that several states wanted the issue to be debated, 
but that the US continued to oppose any discussion on NSAs in this context.255 This 
notwithstanding, references to SALW transfers to non-state actors have continued to 
be made at more recent Programme of Action conferences.256  
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Writing in 2003, Garcia noted that very few international and regional 
instruments on SALW control included prevention of transfers to NSAs.257 Since that 
time, only the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements for Export Control of 
MANPADS, the Asia-Pacific Economic Community’s Bangkok Declaration on 
Partnership for the Future258 and the ECOWAS Convention have explicitly stated that 
non-state actors are to be denied the ability to purchase SALW.259 These statements 
reflect an on-going concern about the dangers of allowing NSAs to have access to 
small arms, but the fact that they are rare exceptions to the rule also raises serious 
doubts about the acceptance and influence of this norm.  
The norm against SALW transfers to non-state actors in the Arms 
Trade Treaty 
In the ATT context, the norm against small arms transfers to non-state actors 
has been referred to on several occasions, despite overall low levels of support for it 
since its inception. When states responded to Resolution 61/89260, spoke at a series of 
workshops on the Arms Trade Treaty261 and addressed the first PrepCom262, several 
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mentioned non-state actors specifically. During the first PrepCom, chair Ambassador 
Moritán released several draft papers on the topics raised. One of these, the 
Chairman’s Draft Principles, released on July 14, noted that a possible principle 
could be  
Reaffirming that the transfer of conventional arms, including small arms 
and light weapons, must be expressly authorised by competent 
government authorities as well as a clear prohibition of transfers to 
unauthorised non-state actors…263 
This document was obviously influenced by statements from those states which 
support the interpretation of the norm that prevents access to SALW by NSAs, such 
as the African Group, Norway, and Brazil.264 However Iran and Syria objected to 
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specifically to this clause on non-state actors265, and the Philippines, Pakistan and 
Nigeria noted their objections to the general subject.266 In light of this, the paragraph 
was deleted, meaning that no mention of non-state actors appeared in the final 
outcome document of the first PrepCom, the 2010 Chairman’s Draft Paper, although 
there is a watered-down reference to “unauthorised … users” in the goals and 
objectives.267 It also disappears completely after the second PrepCom.268 What factors 
explain the absence of this nascent norm from the ATT? 
Preventing diversion of weapons to non-state actors 
Two clear themes emerged from early discussions about the norm: preventing 
diversion to NSAs and differentiating between authorised and unauthorised non-state 
actors.                                                                                                            The goal 
of preventing the diversion of small arms transfers to non-state actors was raised by 
numerous states at the PrepCom269, and had been raised in a number of fora prior to 
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that.270 States noted with concern the fact that diversion from licit stocks is often how 
armed groups acquire weapons.271 Of the 39 states that mentioned diversion in their 
submissions to Resolution 61/89, four specifically raised the issue of preventing 
diversion to “non-state actors”.272 Other states referred to the need to prevent 
weapons being diverted to “proscribed groups” such as terrorists or criminals, some 
mentioned preventing diversion to the illicit market or “unauthorised” users, while 
the remainder were concerned about diversion more generally. Preventing diversion 
to NSAs is the broadest interpretation of the norm regulating transfers these groups 
in the ATT, as it precludes all non-state actors from access to weapons. PrepCom 
chair Ambassador Moritán included prevention of diversion in two separate 
paragraphs in his Chairman’s Draft Principles but noted, in relation to his earlier 
Chairman’s Draft Elements, that he believed that it would be covered by addressing 
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other concerns.273 Both closed sessions on Implementation and Application and 
Parameters discussed preventing transfers to non-state actors by way of diversion 
using regulation mechanisms and enforcement.274 The final outcome document of the 
first PrepCom retained the mention of preventing diversion in two ‘principles’ to be 
included in the Treaty and, in addition, one principle was moved to a higher position 
in the document.275 The prevention of diversion was clearly stated as a principle of 
the ATT in the outcome document of the second PrepCom.276  
States are concerned about diversion to NSAs, because of violence and 
human rights abuses enabled by access to weapons.277 Army and police stockpiles are 
known to be an important source for the diversion of weapons to the illicit market, 
and this is where many NSAs obtain their arsenals.278 This can be for a variety of 
reasons, including a lack of secure storage facilities or corruption amongst security 
force personnel. Several states have made an effort to build their stockpile security, 
in consideration of this, which shows that they are concerned about inadvertent 
transfers to NSAs.279 Various states believe that the Arms Trade Treaty should 
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incorporate a control mechanism to prevent transfers to non-state actors via diversion 
because they fear that their power would be challenged by allowing such transfers. 
On the other hand, India agrees that diversion to non-state actors is inappropriate, but 
denies that new legal mechanisms are needed; instead claiming that it is the failure to 
effectively implement current laws that allows weapons to enter the illicit market and 
get into the hands of NSAs.280 This development of the norm towards preventing 
diversion of weapons to NSAs is also voiced by those states that have issues with 
stockpile security but want additional assistance to combat this. States want to 
continue trading weapons, while avoiding accusations of allowing NSAs access to 
weapons.281 The norm regulating weapons transfers to NSAs has evolved towards 
preventing diversion to these actors, and this form of the norm is being diffused in 
the ATT context. This includes the majority of states recognising it, and is thus a 
strong and positive direction for the norm to take in order to continue within the 
Treaty norm cluster, because it represents some acceptance by states that not all 
transfers of weapons to NSAs are useful.  
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The prevention of terrorism has been listed as a concern by a number of 
states in their reporting on the potential for an ATT282, and in official Treaty 
settings.283 States continually referred to terrorism and most advocated an ATT that 
included preventing the acquisition of conventional weapons by terrorists.284 No state 
wants to be accused of facilitating terrorism or aiding terrorists. Florquin and Warner 
point to the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States as a turning point for the debate 
on NSAs, when states rejected further engagement with them and moved towards 
classifying all armed non-state actors as ‘terrorists’.285 Such a classification has 
important connotations due to the post-9/11 anti-terrorism regime under the auspices 
of the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Resolutions 1269, 
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1373 and 1540.286 After 2001, states began to increase their ratification and 
compliance with these international legal instruments to ensure compliance with the 
new international counter-terrorism regime.287 
As the world’s most powerful state, the US’ influence on these principles is 
strong and it has taken a hard line on terrorism. Subsequently, counter-terrorism 
legislation, information sharing and capacity building among other states have 
increased significantly since the 9/11 attacks.288 US views on the ATT were also 
shaped in this context. US officials describe it as a legal instrument worth 
participating in because it seeks to prevent transfers of weapons “to rogue states, 
terrorist groups, and groups seeking to unsettle regions”.289 This focus on combatting 
terrorism has been a significant catalyst for international co-operation and a tipping 
point for the norm regulating transfers to non-state actors, as it evolves towards 
preventing diversion. The US has the ability to reward or punish states depending on 
their perceived support (or lack of) for its anti-terrorism agenda.290 Aligning the ATT 
with terrorism prevention both gives precedence to terrorism and reinforces the US 
position that while some states (and non-state actors) are not considered problematic, 
and may be supported by direct or indirect diversion of weapons, others are.291  
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This move towards diversion prevention is interesting then, as it refocuses 
the lens onto national evaluation of who is authorised to have access to SALW and 
preventing others from access. Linking prevention of diversion to the norm against 
small arms transfers to NSAs emphasises national discretion in granting 
authorisation and the primacy of the state in making these decisions, albeit within the 
bounds of the proposed international law. Such an alignment underscores the fact 
that while NGOs have got the issue onto the ATT agenda, powerful states are able to 
frame it into something more acceptable to their concerns about national security, or 
reject it. This restricts the scope of the norm considerably and shows that promoters 
of the original norm such as Oxfam and Amnesty International, who continue to 
press for all actors to be covered by the Treaty, have not been able to convince states 
to take a comprehensive approach to preventing transfers to NSAs.292 They have not 
been able to mount a successful defence against powerful states promoting other 
variations of the norm. Instead, powerful states like Russia, the US and the UK 
support preventing some diversion of weapons to NSAs because they want control 
over who has access to weapons.293 This narrower evolution of the norm has been 
taken further in the context of Treaty discussions, as will be demonstrated in the next 
section. 
                                               
292 Amnesty International, Dead on Time – Arms Transportation, Brokering and the Threat to Human 
Rights; Amnesty International, Deadly Movements: Arms Transportation Controls in the Arms Trade 
Treaty; Control Arms Campaign, Arms Without Borders: Why a Globalised Trade Needs Global 
Controls; Cornish, Arms Trade Treaty - Building Consensus and Making it Work; Greene and 
Kirkham, Preventing Diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Issues and Priorities for 
Strengthened Controls.  
293 See the next section for more detail on this. Duncan, “Open-Ended Working Group: Towards an 
Arms Trade Treaty. Intervention by Ambassador John Duncan, 4 March 2009. Scope of a Potential 
Arms Trade Treaty”; Petlyakov, “On the Activities of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) to 
Address the Issues of the International Trade in Conventional Arms. Statement by Sergey Y 
Petlyakov (Russian Federation)”; Petlyakov, “Regarding the Aims and Purposes of an International 
Arms Trade Treaty. Statement by Sergey Y Petlyakov (Russian Federation)”; United Nations General 
Assembly, Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Establishing Common International Standards for the 
Import, Export and Transfer of Conventional Arms.  
87 
 
Authorised non-state actors versus unauthorised non-state actors 
 The norm preventing weapons transfers to NSAs presumes that states will 
not transfer small arms to non-state actors. States seek to retain decision-making 
over what is imported into their states, and unapproved small arms transfers to NSAs 
represent a genuine danger. Conversely, states that arm non-state actors wish to 
continue to have this ability, as mentioned above. One example of this occurred 
around 1980, when the US provided weapons to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan so 
that they could fight against the Soviets for themselves and for the US, who was 
engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet nation at the time.294 There has also been 
considerable debate about whether to bar transfers to all non-state armed groups or 
simply those not deemed to have the proper authority, and how to implement the 
norm.295 The outcome documents from the Arms Trade Treaty PrepCom show this 
plainly, where the Chairman’s Draft Principles paper states that the Treaty should 
contain “a clear prohibition of transfers to unauthorised non-State actors”.296 The 
Facilitator’s Summary on Parameters says that states should consider adding 
measures into the Treaty to prevent transfers where there is a risk of the weapons 
being transferred to “unauthorised end-users or non-state actors”.297 However, this 
distinction is removed from the principles in the 2010 Chairman's Draft Paper and 
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instead one of the Treaty’s goals has become preventing diversion to “unauthorised 
uses and users”.298   
The change has resulted from a debate about the definition of a non-state 
actor, but also from state concerns about their national security and sovereignty in a 
world of intra-state conflict and terrorism. As mentioned earlier, this thesis defines 
NSAs as armed groups who use force to reach their goals and are not controlled by 
the state. There are a wide variety of groups which fit this definition299, and some 
have a level of civilian support such as Hezbollah and the Taliban.300 In discussing 
the ATT, states mentioned formalising a definition of NSAs, but there was a mixed 
reaction to this suggestion because of the varied roles they play and actions they 
undertake.301 There was no agreement on what a non-state actor was, but there was a 
clear move towards classifying NSAs as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  
In its response to Resolution 61/89, Brazil distinguished between authorised 
and “unauthorised non-state actors”, the latter of which are prevented from acquiring 
small arms.302 This approach echoes a distinction made in earlier publications by 
Biting the Bullet and the UN Development Programme, between authorised and 
unauthorised users of SALW.303 Nine other states agreed that the ATT should include 
controls to prevent transfers to ‘unauthorised users’; including New Zealand, which 
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2010: Gangs, Groups, and Guns, chap. 3, 10.  
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specified that this included terrorists.304 The idea of “non-authorised” non-state actors 
also arose at a Dakar meeting of states on the ATT.305 Brazil continued to promote 
this distinction between authorised and unauthorised NSAs at the PrepCom306 and 
this was echoed by other states that began to agree that this was an acceptable 
development with regard to the norm.307 Brazil’s norm promotion efforts have proved 
effective because they are also supported by powerful states, such as the EU and the 
US.308 There are some limits to this agreement however, with states not explicitly 
calling for the prevention of transfers to NSAs; rather some have continued to couch 
it in terms of preventing transfers to ‘unauthorised users’.309 Other states did not 
mention the norm at the PrepCom but their previous statements endorse this position, 
for example the United States, which made it clear that there were cases in which a 
non-state actor could have weapons transferred to it, as alluded to earlier. In line with 
this, the Facilitator’s Summary on Parameters and the final outcome documents of 
the two PrepComs made reference to terrorism.310 
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The development of the norm preventing transfers to non-state actors clearly 
distinguishes between NGOs and governments that want to regulate all transfers 
(including those between states), and those states that want to control some transfers 
(namely those to unauthorised non-state actors). As was noted earlier, not all states 
want an ATT to contain measures that would restrict transfers to NSAs, as they want 
to be able to (continue to) use these NSAs for their own goals. Some governments 
also believe that there are occasions when a non-state actor is justified in using force 
against a state if it is deemed to have become corrupt, repressive or violent against its 
citizens.311 In these situations, it could meet the stringent criteria for a “hard case”,  
which justifies a weapons transfer to a non-state actor.312 State transfers of weapons 
to NSAs have changed the way that states think about non-state actors and their 
acquisition of weapons, making it more acceptable in the eyes of some states for 
specific non-state groups and organisations to utilise force in pursuit of their goals. 
However there is a distinction made between NSAs which are considered acceptable, 
or considered to have a more legitimate ‘cause’, and those which are not. In general, 
the decision over who will become authorised depends on the states and actors, the 
geopolitics of the situation, the costs and benefits, and the willingness of the state to 
become involved. It must also be noted that the classification of authorised or 
unauthorised is not static. These states agree, however, that some NSAs are more 
‘legitimate’ than others and wish to continue transferring weapons to them. This 
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evolution of the norm allows states the freedom to decide if an actor will be 
authorised to take action and to transfer weapons to them to carry this out.  
A lesser number of voices continued to promote the comprehensive norm, 
preventing any weapons transfers to NSAs.313 There are two types of states that 
support this version of the norm – those that believe that transfers to NSAs are a 
threat to human security and those that believe that transfers to NSAs are a threat to 
national security. These governments are convinced that there can be no ‘hard cases’ 
in which a transfer of weapons to non-state actors might be warranted. They warn 
against arming NSAs because it breaches the right of states to hold a monopoly on 
the use of force, and principles of territorial integrity and non-intervention.314 For 
example, Bangladesh referred to a Treaty which allows only legal transfers of 
conventional weapons between states, and went on to exhort that states “should not 
hand over the imported weapons to any political group or insurgent groups [sic]”.315 
This statement represents a vehement pronouncement of the view of a majority of 
states, which is that NSAs are a threat to state legitimacy and survival. It is easy to 
determine why states support this view because in most cases, the governments 
deciding which NSAs are authorised are external; i.e. another state is choosing to 
arm a local population against its own government. This breaks one of the most 
sacred norms of international relations – non-intervention. By diminishing the taboo 
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on transfers to NSAs, states undermine the age-old tenet of the state as sole 
legitimate holder of the monopoly on the use of force and risk weakening state 
sovereignty through a form of intervention. For this reason, states that vigorously 
defend the sanctity of sovereignty, like China and Egypt, sought to prevent any 
weapons transfers to NSAs316, despite the fact that in some cases, their practises are 
inconsistent with their public statements.317 Several of these states have experienced 
armed conflict within their borders involving non-state actors, and their reservations 
about a Treaty which allows any ‘militarisation’ of NSAs stem from this.318 These 
actors were able to successfully oppose the emergent development of the norm 
distinguishing between authorised and unauthorised NSAs, although many of the 
states that endorse this approach to the norm are not particularly powerful (excepting 
China and Russia). These states have some power to draw the debate out or weaken 
the norm, due to the need for consensus in the Treaty process. This in turn gives 
states that oppose the norm the power to dilute the norm further, because they are 
able to grind down the resistance of states that prefer a (comprehensive) Treaty being 
decided. It is also difficult to classify NSAs into ‘good’ or ‘bad’ – or in this case 
authorised and unauthorised – which makes the implementation and enforcement of 
such a distinction close to impossible, particularly as states are likely to disagree 
over which groups are ‘authorised’ and which are not. Therefore, although the 2010 
Chairman’s Draft Paper replaces the ‘non-state actors’ with ‘users’, the term 
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“unauthorised” has disappeared entirely by the time of the second PrepCom, 
suggesting that powerful states including Russia and China have been successful at 
removing this version of the norm.319 The difficulty in determining which NSAs are 
authorised and unauthorised has proven too difficult to regulate.   
Conclusions 
The norm preventing transfers of weapons to non-state actors sits 
precariously within the ATT norm cluster. Few states openly called for its inclusion 
in the Treaty at the PrepCom in July 2010, reflecting both its complexity and how it 
has been modified over time. Initially, the norm presumed that states would not 
transfer weapons to any NSAs and was taken up by some states and organisations in 
the late 1990s. It made its way into the Arms Trade Treaty discussions through the 
efforts of the Biting the Bullet campaign, who worked with a small group of like-
minded states. Within the context of the ATT debates however, the norm evolved to 
focus exclusively on preventing diversion to NSAs and distinguishing between two 
types of NSAs – authorised and unauthorised.  
The split between states over whether to allow transfers of SALW to non-
state actors remains, with the majority refraining from comment in an 
acknowledgement of the complexity and sensitivity of the issue. As the norm 
continues to evolve towards a narrow focus on preventing diversion of transfers to 
NSAs however, it stands a better chance of becoming accepted in the ATT, having 
reached a point where enough states support this evolution to carry it forward. 
Efforts to promote an approach which would allow transfers to only ‘authorised’ 
actors, rather than focusing on non-state actors, has not proved as fruitful because of 
the difficulty in determining which NSAs are to be authorised, who decides this and 
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how it will be implemented. The opposition of powerful states like China was 
enough to prevent this approach to the norm from reaching a tipping point and fully 
emerging. 
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Chapter Six – Civilian Possession and the Arms Trade 
Treaty 
Introduction 
This final chapter explores attempts to diffuse a norm regulating civilian 
possession of small arms, and include it within the Arms Trade Treaty. This norm 
predominantly deals with small arms, as light weapons are typically more heavily 
proscribed within domestic legislation. It has also proved highly controversial in the 
context of the ATT, as several states and NGOs openly objected to its inclusion. To 
understand its evolution and current status, this chapter will first describe the norm, 
before outlining its development prior to the establishment of the ATT process. It 
then seeks to explain the controversies around regulating civilian ownership, both 
nationally and internationally. Finally, the chapter will assess how the norm has been 
incorporated into the cluster of norms in the ATT and will attempt to explain the 
responses of states to the norm, and the future prospects for the norm in the Treaty 
norm cluster.  
Regulating Civilian Possession of Small Arms  
There are hundreds of millions of small arms in circulation in the world and 
the majority of these weapons are civilian owned.320 Rationales for the state to permit 
civilian possession of weapons are related to personal self-defence, hunting and sport 
shooting.  Weapons collectors, sport shooters and game hunters alike claim the right 
to possess a variety of different firearms for recreational and competition sports.321 In 
addition, civilians in the US have the ‘right to bear arms’ enshrined in the Bill of 
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Rights. Those who wish to retain access to weapons refer to statistics that show that 
misuse of weapons is undertaken by ‘criminals’ with ‘illegal’ weapons which they 
have obtained on the ‘black market’. Conversely, those wanting tighter regulation of 
firearms ownership note that most ‘illegal’ weapons were originally bought legally 
and have made their way to an unlicensed owner. There is a vast literature about the 
relationship between weapons availability and incidents of crime and armed 
violence, but major differences remain among scholars.322 This lack of consensus 
among scholars and analysts has contributed to the heated debate about regulating 
civilian possession of firearms.  
Why civilian possession of small arms needs regulation 
Many of those who own weapons have licences to possess them, are safety 
conscious and do not on-sell the items to unlicensed persons, but there are others 
who are not as scrupulous about their behaviour.323 Likewise, there are a number of 
legitimate arms dealers who follow national legislative guidelines and sell within 
regulatory limits; and there are a number who do not.324 These weapons make their 
way into the hands of those who use them illegally and are often ‘recycled’ through 
various owners. According to Garcia 
… there is now a general recognition that civilian-owned guns help to 
fuel the illicit arms trade as a result of theft, unsafe storage or sale.325 
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These weapons can go on to become involved in crimes and human rights abuses in 
the origin state or in another state.326 For his reason, some NGOs and concerned 
states have acted to promote the norm regulating civilian possession of small arms at 
a global level. 
The development of the norm regulating civilian possession of small 
arms 
The norm consists of three requirements, the first being that states regulate 
which civilians can possess small arms; the second is a licensing system327, and the 
third being a sanctions mechanism.328 The regulation which states put in place 
nationally works on a basic model, which prevents individuals from possession of 
small arms if they have committed a (specific) crime, have diminished mental 
capacity or are under a specified age limit.329 The licensing system then verifies that 
this individual or business can access weapons legitimately or that the weapon is 
registered to a specific person or business.330 Garcia argues that an international norm 
requiring the regulation of civilian possession of small arms began to emerge around 
2006, when states started to recognise that they had a duty to outline the 
“responsibilities” that citizens possessing weapons must accept, due to their lethal 
nature.331 Previously, even many pro-disarmament NGOs had been reluctant to 
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incorporate disapproval of civilian holdings of weapons in their disarmament 
campaigns for “strategic reasons”, worrying that it would attract opposition from the 
well-resourced and powerful gun lobby332. Strong advocacy from a minority of ‘gun-
free’ NGOs such as Viva Rio and Gun-Free South Africa created a change in 
direction amongst NGOs.333 The norm’s growing profile at the international level can 
be traced to the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the 
1995 UN Economic and Social Council’s resolution entitled Firearm Regulation for 
the Purpose of Crime Prevention and Public Health and Safety, which established 
the issue on the agenda of the United Nations.334 The resulting report from the UN 
Secretary-General was a collation of the world’s firearms regulation which 
concludes recommendations that states regulate “safe use and storage of firearms”, 
with a variety of licensing and punitive mechanisms to enforce these behaviours.335 
The UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice played a key role in 
norm promotion in the early years, as have like-minded governments and NGOs like 
Viva Rio and Gun-Free South Africa, as they have worked to promote the norm 
despite opposition from gun lobby groups in a number of states like the US and 
Canada.336  
Attempts at norm promotion within states have not been particularly 
successful despite the efforts of some NGOS. Where gun control advocates are able 
to successfully graft the norm onto notions of common humanity and dangers to 
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public health, they have more success, as they are able link the norm to particular 
triggers that catalyse public reaction. In terms of the norm promoting regulation of 
civilian possession key catalytic events are, unfortunately, often deaths. The tragic 
events that unfolded at Port Arthur, Dunblane and Ecole Polytechnique in the 1990s 
illustrate three cases where mass killings led to public debate about appropriate 
legislation on firearms possession.337 Such norm promotion needs a strong advocate 
with a clear message and an organisational platform to build from. The Gun Control 
Network, formed in the aftermath of Dunblane, was able to lobby the British 
Government for changes to legislation on handguns, air rifles, and imitation guns; 
with its efforts particularly evident in the United Kingdom’s Violent Crime 
Reduction Act (2006).338 Increasing evidence of criminal activity involving firearms 
in South Africa has been the target of action by Gun Free South Africa. As well as 
influencing national legislation, it supported increased enforcement of the Firearms 
Control Act (2000) and continued to research and advocate on the issue, making 
South Africa a strong advocate for the ATT.339 However the tragic mass-killing 
which took place at Columbine High School (1999) in the US had little impact on 
domestic policy, according to Birkland and Lawrence. They attribute this to the way 
that it was portrayed in the media, and the result of this was that any potential 
message about regulating civilian possession of weapons was lost amid a wider 
debate about youth and their behaviour.340 This undermined the message about gun 
control, much to the dismay of anti-gun norm promoters such as the Brady Center to 
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Prevent Gun Violence, as they were unable to use their organisational platform to 
generate more support for the norm.341  
Most regional legislative measures on small arms between 1997 and 2001 did 
not include any reference to civilian firearms possession, the exceptions being the 
Bamako Declaration, the Nairobi Declaration and the SADC Protocol.342 However 
since that time, the Andean Plan, the Arab Model Law, the Central American Code 
of Conduct and the ECOWAS Convention have all included the norm, indicating an 
increase in regulation of civilian possession.343 The ECOWAS Convention prohibits 
possession of light weapons outright but allows for some civilian possession of small 
arms.344 While many states have agreed to establish laws regulating the possession of 
small arms by civilians, surveys suggest that its actual implementation has been 
sporadic.345 Even if there has been growing rhetoric around the norm at the regional 
and international level, it does not seem to be as well diffused as it may first appear, 
as even states from the regions which endorse the norm have not institutionalised it 
into a strong position in their own legislation.      
As was noted, the nascent norm is notable for its opponents who argue 
against regulation or stronger regulation of civilian possession of these weapons, 
asserting that their citizens have a traditional, cultural and or constitutional ‘right’ to 
                                               
341 Horwitz and Grimaldi, “NRA-led gun lobby wields powerful influence over ATF, U.S. politics.”   
342 Garcia, Small Arms and Security: New Emerging International Norms, 168–169.  
343 Andean Community, Decision 552: Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects (and Annexes); Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their 
Ammunition and Other Related Materials; Interior Ministers Council League of Arab States (General 
Secretariat), Arab Model Law on Weapons, Ammunitions, Explosives and Hazardous Material; 
Nicaragua, “Working Paper Submitted by Nicaragua: Code of Conduct of Central American States on 
the Transfer of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materiel 
(A/CONF.192/2006/RC/WP.6).”  
344 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms 
and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. Article 14. 
345 Alpers and Wilson, “Gun Policy: Facts and News.”  
101 
 
possess weapons. The most prominent of these are Australia, Canada346, New 
Zealand and the United States, whose residents claim the right to own weapons for 
the purposes of recreational use, or personal self-defence.347 Several Middle Eastern 
states, where there is a high level of civilian weapons possession, are also against 
tougher regulation of small arms.348 Powerful pro-gun NGOs work to ensure that this 
right is not undermined by regulation, lobbying parliamentarians and officials 
regarding national and international small arms laws. Most groups are organised on a 
national basis, but have ties to similar organisations abroad. Most notably, the NRA 
and its Institute for Legislative Action (NRA-ILA) are active internationally, with 
the ability to mobilise its members’ views on small arms issues.349 During the 2001 
Programme of Action Conference, the power of the NRA was demonstrated when 
the United States “harped on its ‘redline’ items: … [including] rules on civilian 
possession (an NRA no-no)” in the conference.350 The NRA has been able to hinder 
the progress of gun regulation in the US and other countries.351 It denies allegations 
that its actions are preventing law enforcement officials the ability to do their job, by 
promoting weapons availability and possession, claiming that such possession is a 
deterrent for crime and useful as a self-defence tool. Other pro-gun NGOs that have 
been active internationally include the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting 
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Activities (WFSA), the International Coalition of Women in Shooting and Hunting 
(WiSH), and the Defense Small Arms Advisory Council (DSAAC). These 
organisations argue that legal owners of weapons are not the problem, citing 
statistics that support this position, such as the numbers of illegal guns in circulation 
and highlighting criminal activity with these weapons.352 
Regulating civilian possession of small arms in relation to the Arms 
Trade Treaty 
Though it has many critics, a few states and several NGOs continue to 
promote the norm of regulating civilian possession with regard to the ATT. States 
responded to the challenge of what should be included in an Arms Trade Treaty in 
the A/62/278 series of reports and in these submissions, five states specifically 
mentioned the need to regulate or increase regulation of civilian possession. 353 A 
small number of states also mentioned the norm in other Treaty settings prior to the 
first PrepCom.354 During the first PrepCom itself, only one state – Mexico – 
promoted the norm directly, revealing its lack of broad support in the face of 
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continuing strong opposition.355 The chair of the PrepCom, Ambassador Moritán, 
released the Chairman’s Draft Principles on July 14, which ignited the debate among 
states about the subject, because it noted in paragraph seven: 
Recognising the right of States to regulate internal transfers of arms and 
national ownership, including through national constitutional protections 
on private ownership, exclusively within their territory… 356 
Regulation of internal weapons transfers and private possession of weapons are 
regarded intrinsically national concerns, not usually subject to international scrutiny. 
During the closed session on the scope of an ATT, states discussed such restrictions 
and the proposal to allow ‘exceptions’ to the Treaty for “internal transfers”, “national 
ownership and regulation” and “sporting and hunting rifles for recreational 
purposes”.357 The result of these discussions was that the 2010 Chairman’s Draft 
Paper included a subsection of scope for exclusions358, and an almost verbatim 
paragraph from the Chairman’s Draft Principles on regulation of civilian ownership 
and internal transfers.359 This reinforced the position of those who sought to strip any 
reference to regulating civilian possession from the Treaty, and shows that the norm 
is not likely to remain within the ATT cluster. What explains this absence? 
Opposition to the norm regulating civilian possession 
States that oppose the inclusion of the norm regulating civilian possession do 
so for two broad reasons. The first, which has been used by the US, is that their 
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constituents have the right to maintain their individual freedom and to own weapons. 
The second reason offered by states is that they object to regulating a domestic issue 
at the international level. In some cases, both reasons are given by states for their 
opposition to the norm. Several clearly stated at the first PrepCom that some 
‘civilian uses’ of arms ought to be allowed and that regulation of “domestic gun 
ownership” is not an objective of the Treaty in their view.360 New Zealand 
commented on the need to include the “right to regulate internal transfers as well as 
the ownership and possession of arms within states’ territory”, and suggested that a 
section entitled “Exclusions” be introduced into the scope of the Treaty.361 This 
would allow certain types of possession, sale and use to be exempt from international 
scrutiny. There are several interest groups and NGOs in New Zealand that are 
putting pressure on the government to retain their freedom to possess small arms.362 
There are similar groups in other states that are also placing their political 
representatives under heavy pressure to prevent the norm being included in the ATT. 
Many states did not mention the norm at all at the first PrepCom because of the 
strong stance taken by the United States against the norm and the Treaty.363 They 
have been unwilling to undermine talks by discussing regulating civilian possession 
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of weapons because they know the strong sentiments of the US on the issue and the 
power of the pro-gun lobby.364  
In some ways the norm was always going to be a topic of discussion at the 
first ATT PrepCom, the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’, after the US’ decision not 
to join negotiations in the beginning.365 This opposition to the norm was not 
unexpected, as a group of states also opposed the inclusion of this norm in the earlier 
Programme of Action.366 As a Permanent Member of the United Nations Security 
Council, the United States remains a very formidable state within the UN and its 
unwillingness to join the Treaty when it first emerged in 2006 was clear. The United 
States’ resistance to debating the Treaty was based in large part on domestic pressure 
from pro-gun NGOs which contest the regulation of civilian possession norm, and in 
turn from supportive (predominantly Republican) politicians in the US.367 President 
George W. Bush has long supported gun rights and continued to do so during his 
term, when the idea of an ATT was first conceived.368 Bush said he supported the 
individual’s right to possess firearms and refused to participate in discussions on the 
ATT because of this. Pro-gun NGOs publicise political and presidential candidates’ 
statements on civilian possession of weapons, to enable their members to choose 
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which candidate they support in elections based on this stance.369 These groups are 
vocal and well-practised at responding to domestic small arms issues which could be 
used to push for greater regulation, such as the mass murders at Columbine High 
School and Virginia Tech.370 They are also well organised and have a clear message: 
regulation of the possession of SALW infringes on an individual right. These 
powerful pro-gun NGOs in the US reiterate the importance of the Second 
Amendment in the Bill of Rights and maintain pressure on political candidates.371 
They argue that ‘gun control’ infringes on individual rights and reject much of the 
evidence offered to show the damage done by small arms, saying that the evidence is 
inaccurate, biased or incomplete.372 The NRA’s President Wayne LaPierre stated, in a 
2004 debate with former IANSA director Rebecca Peters, that the international small 
arms control process was “the UN’s attempt to weaken our Second Amendment”.373 
At the first PrepCom, DSAAC’s representative Major-General Youngman (Ret.) 
claimed that including civilian possession in the ATT would give “credibility to the 
suspicion … that the true purpose of the treaty is domestic gun control [sic]”.374 
When President Barack Obama took office, lobbying continued from pro-gun 
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NGOs375, but eventually his administration agreed to discuss an ATT, although this 
announcement was limited by an addendum indicating that the US would join the 
discussion based on the rule of consensus – effectively giving it veto power over 
what it deemed unacceptable issues.376  
There are other international, national and local pro-gun NGOs which reject 
attempts to include the norm regulating civilian possession of weapons in the ATT, 
providing a rival position to that of anti-gun NGOs.377 These pro-gun NGOs are able 
to successfully reframe the problems with small arms and civilian possession as 
resulting from ‘criminals engaged in firearms violence and illegal firearms activities’ 
rather than ‘legal owners engaged in legitimate firearms activities’. In a similar way, 
they are also able to frame the problems as happening in other places or countries 
and therefore not ‘our’ problem. Canada has two vocal organisations which promote 
safe, legal civilian access to firearms: the Canadian Shooting Sports Association and 
the National Firearms Association.378 New Zealand has several pro-gun organisations 
including the National Rifle Association of New Zealand (NRANZ) and the Council 
of Licensed Firearms Owners (COLFO)379 and Australia also has organisations such 
as the Sporting Shooters’ Association of Australia (SSAA)  380, which advocate for the 
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‘gun rights’ of their members. Many of these powerful NGOs are politically active 
on limiting regulation on civilian possession. For example, Canada’s referendum on 
changes to its Long Gun Registry was held amid fierce lobbying against the 
proposed changed by pro-gun NGOs.381 These NGOs also have been allowed a 
political role; COLFO represented New Zealand at the third Biennial Meeting on the 
Programme of Action and WiSH represented Australia at this same meeting.382 Such 
groups also exist in other countries like Finland and Denmark, and actively lobby 
their Governments to ensure that legislative and regulatory restrictions on the 
civilian possession of weapons are minimal. They often link civilian possession to 
specific cultural and traditional practices, as mentioned earlier, to make changes to 
existing laws harder. Canada and New Zealand have a tradition of game hunting 
which is said to be part of the culture of rural life and a right enjoyed for many 
years.383 A related fact is that that there is a “variety of actors and uses” for these 
weapons, such as for competition shooting and by private security forces384, making 
it more difficult to argue that there is no use for them, as has been possible for other 
weapons.385 Powerful pro-gun NGOs are thus able to argue internationally and 
domestically that the norm misses its true target, or to successfully frame the norm as 
rejecting part of the national heritage. Because of this pressure, these states have 
continued to prevent the norm from gaining any traction at the Treaty debates against 
promotion of the norm regulating civilian possession by anti-gun NGOs.   
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In a similarly anti-regulation position, New Zealand’s remark at the first 
PrepCom, which noted the state’s right to regulate internal transfers, was supported 
by a number of other powerful states. Canada, the EU, Iran, Israel, and the United 
Kingdom all agreed that this issue is outside the purview of the Treaty, justifying 
their stance on the basis that non-intervention in domestic affairs is a cardinal 
principle of international politics.386 Thus in official discussions on the Arms Trade 
Treaty during 2010, the regulation of civilian possession continued to be politically 
controversial, with very few states supporting it and several states outright declaring 
that civilian possession is not an issue which should be included in the Treaty.  
Support for the norm regulating civilian possession of small arms 
Despite considerable opposition from powerful states and rival non-state 
groups, the nascent norm requiring regulation of civilian possession has been raised 
in ATT debates by a small number of states and several NGOs, including IANSA 
and the Biting the Bullet Project. Biting the Bullet published a 2003 paper on the 
issue, which suggested that such regulation of civilian possession was important to 
ensure human security because   
… the civilian possession of weapons increases the risk of gun violence 
in a way that potentially infringes on individuals’ freedom, their human 
rights and indeed sometimes their lives.387 
This finding was based on rates of mortality among conflict and non-conflict 
populations, as well as the injuries sustained from small arms fire and from violence 
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perpetrated under threat of small arms fire.388 With this in mind, NGOs like Gun Free 
South Africa, the Gun Control Network and Viva Rio continue to promote the norm, 
predominantly at the national level.389 However few states have promoted this norm 
regulating civilian possession of small arms with any vigour at the international level 
and in the ATT, in large part because they know that many powerful states and pro-
gun NGOs have taken a strong stance against the norm.390 States which had earlier 
supported the norm were deafeningly silent at the first PrepCom, giving the floor to 
those states which announced their desire to see the scope of the Treaty restricted to 
‘international issues’ and those which objected to including this norm in the Treaty 
cluster.391 
The US had made its position on the norm clear in the lead up to the first 
PrepCom and its influence remains powerful, because it agreed to enter the 
negotiations on the basis of consensus. Requiring consensus with regard to the 
Treaty severely limits the likelihood of creating a strong and enforceable document 
in 2012 and the decision was much criticised by pro-disarmament NGOs. Because of 
the US’ consensus position and the power of its national pro-gun NGOs, states 
which support the norm regulating civilian possession have proved reluctant to 
endorse this norm vigorously, as they are unwilling to jeopardise the whole Treaty 
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being derailed by insisting on its retention. The opposition of New Zealand, 
Australia and Canada to the inclusion of the norm in the ATT has also undermined 
its chances. These states openly and influentially endorse many other norms in the 
Treaty but have come out against this norm regulating civilian possession. This 
stance seriously weakens the norm’s prospects, because both Canada and New 
Zealand are known for their pro-disarmament positions. Other pro-disarmament 
states like Norway have focussed on other issues like the inclusion of humanitarian 
law or victim assistance in the Treaty, and did not engage with the norm. This action 
has prevented the norm regulating civilian weapons possession reaching a tipping 
point and diffusing further, allowing the rival opposing norm to flourish. 
The only state that openly supported the norm at the first PrepCom was 
Mexico, whose delegate indicated that all weapons should be included in the scope 
of the Arms Trade Treaty for regulation.392 Mexico’s submission declared that 
decisions on transfers ought to include a consideration of the intended use, not just 
the intended user, and that “arms created for sports” or hunting are no different from 
military weapons due to the ease with which they can be modified.393 The Mexican 
position was clearly influenced by its proximity to the US and the struggles it has 
with illicit trafficking of drugs and SALW by criminal groups.394 There is an 
established trade of legally purchased weapons which are on-sold illegally – in a 
practice known as straw purchasing – and transported from the US to Mexico and 
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other South American states.395 From there, they are used to devastating effect in 
conflicts with other gangs and with law enforcement. Some South American and 
Caribbean states voiced concerns about weak regulation on civilian possession, in 
light of the links made between the illicit trafficking of small arms and narcotics.396 
None of them have publically called for civilian possession to be included in the face 
of the formidable opposition by other states and NGOs, and none of these states have 
the international clout to challenge the opposing norm with success.  
Efforts to include the norm within the ATT norm cluster are failing because 
of the powerful opposition of the US and some traditionally pro-disarmament states 
but also because the few states and NGOs that are supportive of the comprehensive 
norm have not been able to create an effective and coherent message. These various 
norm entrepreneurs have not been able to harmonise their advocacy internationally, 
which has resulted in a weak presence in ATT meetings. Clarke argues that IANSA’s 
policies have been affected by European governments’ focus on illicit weapons 
trading rather than promoting regulation on all weapons.397 IANSA is largely 
supported with funding from European governments, which has at least an implicit 
effect on the focus of its campaigns but also on other pro-disarmament NGOs, 
because it is the dominant NGO campaigning globally on SALW. IANSA’s global 
network helps to gain them perspective on the numerous issues associated with small 
arms use, but it also makes for a sweeping and potentially divergent advocacy 
agenda. NGOs such as Amnesty International and the Control Arms Campaign have 
aligned themselves with IANSA and with general regulation of small arms to prevent 
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continued armed violence, but have conflicting ideas about where the focus of their 
attention ought to be and how to go about regulating SALW. At the first ATT 
PrepCom in 2010, for example, a number of NGOs focussed on other issues, such as 
the inclusion of norms of human rights and victim assistance. They did not engage 
with civilian possession in any detail, spending time on other norms and 
unsuccessfully attempting to gain access to the closed sessions.398 The lack of clarity 
around civilian possession is a barrier to the norm’s emergence because it cannot be 
easily communicated and makes framing the issue as a problem much harder.399 It 
makes opposition to powerful rival NGOs and their actions to prevent the norm 
regulating civilian possession emerging more difficult. Given the lack of strong 
norm promotion at the PrepCom400, and a lack of clarity about the norm itself, the 
norm regulating civilian possession has been unable to gain traction with regard to 
the Arms Trade Treaty.  
Conclusions 
The development of a norm regulating the civilian possession of small arms, 
in the Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster, has been slow due to a number of factors. 
The most prominent is the power of pro-gun NGOs, particularly in the United States, 
which has made states reluctant to raise the issue at the international level. Critics of 
the norm maintain that the real problem lies in the illicit possession of weapons by 
criminals or in states which have high rates of violence and disorder. They have 
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successfully petitioned their respective governments for minimal levels of weapons 
regulation in order to allow civilians to participate in sport shooting or hunting. 
Moreover, states have been reluctant to allow international regulation of weapons 
possession and transfers as it is seen as interference in their domestic affairs. The 
2011 Chairman’s Draft Paper – from the second PrepCom  - dropped reference to the 
norm and reiterated that a core principle of the Treaty will be that states have the 
right to regulate “internal transfers” and allow “national constitutional protections on 
private ownership”.401 For these reasons, advocates for action regulating civilian 
possession of small arms have been unsuccessful in promoting this norm in the ATT. 
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Chapter Seven – Conclusions 
The evolution of the Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster  
The Arms Trade Treaty norm cluster has evolved in discussions among states 
over the last five years, as norm entrepreneurs have sought to advance a range of 
goals. At time of writing, two of the three norms examined here – regulation of 
brokering and preventing weapons transfers to NSAs – are still part of the cluster of 
norms surrounding the ATT. Regulation of civilian possession has failed to emerge 
in the Arms Trade Treaty, after powerful states and NGOs linked together to prevent 
its emergence and promote the rival norm. The relationship between norms and their 
proponents (and opponents) can clearly be seen in the ATT process. Cooperation 
between like-minded states and NGOs has resulted in changes to how the two norms 
of regulating brokering and preventing transfers to NSAs are seen with regard to the 
Treaty but, conversely, it has also constrained movement with respect to the norm 
regulating civilian possession.        
Some answers to my research questions 
Small arms norms in the ATT norm cluster have been pressed by both NGOs 
and supportive states, with the three norms explored here noticeably evolving during 
debates. The analysis presented in this thesis suggests that NGOs and like-minded 
small and middle-powers were able get these norms on to the ATT agenda and into 
inter-governmental discussions, but the shape and content of the norm and progress 
from that point on was dependent on the support of powerful states, who had to be at 
least ambivalent rather than hostile to the norm concerned. This can be seen in the 
paths of the three different norms explored here. The norm regulating brokering of 
small arms began as a comprehensive, widely supported norm addressing the 
regulation of brokers and their activities. However, during debates it was 
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transformed into a much narrower discussion about illicit brokering and questions 
over the efficacy of the norm for this goal. This change came as a result of the US 
and EU states moving their focus towards ‘illicit transfers’ more generally, to allow 
them the freedom to continue some SALW transfers. This was done because of 
concerns about terrorism post 9/11 and a desire to continue profitable weapons 
exports.  
The norm on preventing transfers to non-state groups has also been affected 
by a post-9/11 world. The norm shifted from an initial attempt to ban transfers to one 
that instead focussed attention on preventing diversion to ‘unauthorised’ NSAs, such 
as terrorists. This was because powerful states use NSAs to carry out covert foreign 
policy or seek to implicitly allow transfers to NSAs fighting regimes that are 
‘corrupt’ or ‘repressive’. Furthermore, this norm has lost ground within the ATT 
context, in 2011, because of difficulties in creating legislation which differentiates 
between different kinds of non-state actors.  
Unsurprisingly, the norm regulating civilian possession was not strong 
enough to overcome the formidable objections of the US and an associated group of 
states supporting this position, including Canada and New Zealand, along with 
pressure from strong, organised NGOs like the NRA and its international 
counterparts. NGOs promoted a comprehensive norm to prevent human insecurity 
and armed violence, but states protested at what they perceived to be interference 
and regulation of their internal transfers and defended their citizens’ right to possess 
firearms.  
What was crucial for norm emergence in the ATT cluster? The analysis 
advanced here suggests that norm promotion by like-minded but less influential 
states and NGOs led small arms norms to be part of the agenda for international 
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negotiations but that their goals were able to be contested and defeated by more 
powerful states and NGOs once the norms were under discussion at the ATT 
PrepCom. Organisations which were able to formulate simple and clear messages on 
the norm in question were more likely to be successful at retaining the norm in the 
ATT norm cluster, as were those which managed to convince powerful states of the 
legitimacy of their claims. NGOs were not able to wield a strong influence over the 
development of the norms in the cluster during the PrepCom, which offers important 
lessons for all NGOs working on global issues. It is a reminder of the salience of 
power in international relations, particularly with regard to security norms, and the 
limited ability of NGOs and like-minded minor states to influence normative 
emergence. Norms remained in the ATT norm cluster if they had the support of – or 
avoided hostility from - powerful states, which is a cautionary tale for normative 
theorists. The high expectations of governments and NGOs promoting small arms 
action in the prelude to the ATT negotiations were left in tatters by the positions of 
powerful states on the inclusion of some norms and on the formulation and content 
of others. The strong views of like-minded but comparatively weak states and NGOs 
were not enough to ensure the emergence of a norm.  
Given the evolution of these three norms, it seems certain that none of them 
will remain in their original, more comprehensive form once the ATT is finalised. 
One, civilian possession, will be absent completely. The norm regulating brokering 
has moved sharply towards the narrower US and EU position of focussing solely on 
illicit transfers. Similarly, the norm preventing transfers to NSAs has evolved 
towards preventing transfers to ‘illicit’ NSAs, rather than all NSAs.402 The Arms 
Trade Treaty will remain a key focus for disarmament discussions at the 
                                               
402 Both of these changes appear in the 2011 ‘Chairman’s Draft Paper’. Ibid. 
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international level, but over the last five years the content, shape and strength of its 
norm cluster has shifted towards a narrow focus on the prevention of transfers that 
are illicitly brokered or transferred to illicit actors. It remains to be seen if this 
narrow approach to the structure and content of small arms norms is a permanent 
shift driven by power politics, that may have implications for other human security 
initiatives, or if pro-disarmament NGOs and like-minded states can rise to the 
challenge and develop strategies for advocacy on this issue to ensure that future 
small arms norms are comprehensive and robust.  
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